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ABSTRAC"
The author traces the organizational growth and change within
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) over its 40-year history. A model is
offered which depicts a military organization as an open system
embedded within a changing environment. Selected inputs to this
organizational system are shown to affect organizational structure and,
in turn, the combat capabilities of the force. The author uses the five
major Arab-Israeli wars as critical junctures in examining the IDF's
organizational history. The IDF is shown to have a willingness and
ability to adapt to changing environmental factors. This capacity is
determined to be a major reason for the IDFs long military dominance
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The purpose of this thesis is to give the reader an understanding of
the organizational development of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and
some of its contributions to the study of the military art. This will be
accomplished by modeling the organizational structure of the IDF at
various points in its short history as well as by analyzing the wars it has
fought and the lessons and principles which can be extracted from these
conflicts. The organizational changes which have occurred within the IDF
over time will be explored. It will be shown that the IDF has operated in
concert with a changing environment and that its adaptability has been a
major organizational strength.
This thesis is not intended to provide a detailed tactical battle anal-
ysis of any particular action. Instead, its focus is on identifying broad
organizational trends and identifying appropriate military lessons from
each of the IDF's wars. The Israeli Defense Forces are the world's most
experienced practitioners of mechanized combat. Since winning its inde-
pendence in 1948, Israel has fought six major wars against either one
Arab enemy or a coalition of them. Despite staggering inequalities in
terms of men and equipment, Israel has managed to prevail in each of
these conflicts, in large measure because of the excellence of its defense
forces. The willingness of the military and civilian leadership to realisti-
cally assess the threat, coupled with an ability to structure and train
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their force to meet a given enemy, has proven to be a winning formula for
the Israelis.
B. BACKGROUND
The situation in the Middle East is extremely complex and explosive
due to a myriad of difficult and conflicting issues. These issues include,
but are not limited to, diverse political objectives, social and cultural dif-
ferences, boundary disputes, religious ideologies, and terrorist activities.
Further complicating this region is extensive involvement of the super-
powers ( the United States and the Soviet Union) and global interest in
maintaining a free flow of oil. Thus, there exists a situation characterized
by profound instability coupled with relatively large, well-equipped,
standing military forces in a constant state of alert.
C. WHY ISRAEL AND THE IDF?
Anyone seriously interested in the study and furtherance of U.S.
national security interests and policy should have a solid understanding
of the importance of Israel and the IDF. This contention will be supported
in the text of this thesis. The U.S. was the first nation (Ref. 1:p. 71 to for-
mally recognize the fledgling state on May 14, 1948; since then, succes-
sive administrations have clearly demonstrated a willingness to defend
the right of Israel to exist. U.S. national security policy has been commit-
ted to achieving lasting peace and stability in the region, a policy which
has been largely ineffective to date.
U.S. support of Israel is based on several factors. Prominent among
these is the tremendous sympathy many Americans feel for the plight of
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the Jewish people. The sheer magnitude of the horror which came to be
known as the Holocaust inextricably linked the Jew with the American
consciousness. Secondly, there is a strong political interest group operat-
ing within the United States from an actively partisan constituency of
American Jews. Objectively, however, U.S. support of Israel is largely
based upon self-interest. Israel is solidly democratic and western in its
orientation. It is a crossroads between Asia, Africa, and the western
world. Strategically, [Ref. 2:p. 20] Israel is vulnerable because of lack of
space to trade for time, lack of depth to maneuver, encirclement by hos-
tile nations (most sworn to destroy it), and little geographic buffer for
strategic warning.
The U.S. has long seen Israel as a strong ally in its attempt to pre-
vent the spread of communism in the strategically important Middle
East. Containment of Soviet expansionism has been seen as the key to
insuring that oil supplies from the region flow freely to the United States
and her allies in Europe and Asia. Although the relationship between the
U.S. and Israel has been strained at times, it is in the vital interests of
both nations to maintain mutually supportive postures.
With this in mind, and with the stated intentions of the Arab nations
surrounding Israel to "...push the Jews into the sea," it becomes clear
why a knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli defense
forces is crucial [Ref. 3:p. 48]. Most obviously, if the existence of the state
of Israel was ever seriously called in to question, it is difficult to believe,
in the author's opinion, that the United States would not respond mili-
tarily in support. Despite a lack of formal security agreements, U.S.
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presidents from Truman through Bush have strongly supported the terri-
torial integrity and national security interests of the state of Israel.
Secondly, it is important to study the IDF from a purely professional
military standpoint. This force has repeatedly defeated well-equipped
armies many times its size and has established a reputation as one of the
finest fighting forces in the world. In large measure, the United States
has built this force through its support of equipment and money. Yet,
interestingly, the IDF operates quite differently from her American bene-
factors, for reasons which will be discussed.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
A brief description of each chapter follows which will guide the
reader through the organization of the thesis.
1. Chapter I
This chapter offers a brief background and purpose of the thesis
and addresses the topic's importance.
2. Chapter II
The second chapter establishes a framework from which the IDF
can be systematically analyzed. A model of a combat organization such
as the IDF is offered, suggesting inputs, organizational response, and
system outputs. The Principles of War are defined as a means to analyze
combat actions of the IDF. The Mintzberg model is offered as the stan-
dard measure for capturing the various components of the IDF at key
historical Junctures.
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3. Chapters M through VII
In this section of the thesis, the IDF will be studied at critical
Junctures in its history. Using the framework established in the second
chapter, the IDF will be examined in terms of organizational structure as
well as its particular contributions to the study of the military art. Each
conflict will be summarized using a modified version of the U.S. Army's
five-paragraph field order, thus providing the reader a format which is
easily understandable. The IDFs extraordinary adaptability and willing-
ness to change because of previous lessons learned will be examined in
detail.
4. Chapter VIII
The focus of this chapter is upon the Israeli Defense Forces of
today. Particular attention will be devoted to their disposition, training
techniques, command and control, and reserve system.
5. Chapter IX
This chapter will draw from the study of the IDF lessons in the
art of warfare which appear to be constant over time. The IDF, while
changing significantly as technology and the threat have changed, has
held constant certain inviolate principles. Of particular interest are the
unique yet proven methods of Israeli command and control. Although
technology has enhanced greatly the ability of commanders to gather and
process large amounts of information, the role of the leader in the IDF




This chapter establishes the framework for the subsequent analysis
of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). In the author's opinion, a combat
organization such as the IDF is analogous to an open system embedded
in a changing environment. As such, the combat organization is subject
to various inputs from the environment. These inputs cause change
within the organization and affect the outputs of the system as a whole.
This perspective is the basic frame of reference which will be used in
analyzing the IDF at various key junctures in its history. Each of the
major Arab-Israeli wars will be analyzed to determine what some of the
key inputs to the system were, how and whether these inputs caused
organizational change within the IDF, and whether these changes
resulted in an alteration of system outputs. This organizational model is
depicted graphically in Figure 1.
In order to approach this analysis in a systematic manner, this
chapter will establish the terms and definitions which will be used sub-
sequently. This framework will help to codify in the reader's mind the
approach taken in chapters to follow.
B. INPUTS TO THE SYSTEM
In any open organization subject to a changing environment, the









this thesis that all inputs pertinent to a combat organization such as the
IDF have been identified and gauged for relative importance. Instead, the
author has selected inputs that have, in the course of his research,
appeared to dominate the environment in which the IDF has existed.
1. Threat
In any functioning professional military force, the nature of the
threat is a predominant input to the organizational structure. The threat
i.j, after all, the major reason for the existence of a nation's military
forces. As the threat changes, so must the military organization adapt to
meet it. Stagnation in the face of threat evolution, in the author's opin-
ion, is cause for deep concern. It will be shown that the IDF has adapted
to the changing nature of the real and perceived threat to Israel's
national security.
2. Technology
The technological capabilities of weapons and command and
control systems have been important inputs to the structure of the IDF.
Since 1948, technology has allowed for tremendous changes in combat
capability and has fundamentally altered the IDF's approach to accom-
plishing its mission. Technology cannot be viewed in isolation, however,
because it has worked to increase threat capabilities as well.
3. Socio-Economic Factors
This is an admittedly broad category which can be used to sum-
marize the overall national will and ability to support its military organi-
zation. In Israel, the need for a strong military has never been in doubt,
but (particularly in recent years) the willingness of the citizens to
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sacrifice and serve has somewhat diminished. In part, this may be based
upon a general war weariness among the population [Ref. 4:p. 29]. This
has caused fundamental structural changes in the IDF which will be
explored.
4. Doctrinal Changes
The previously discussed inputs are all pieces of a larger input
which will be referred to as the combat organization's fighting doctrine.
How the organization decides to fight will affect the allocation of scarce
resources such as money, training time, and manpower. These decisions
and resultant resource allocations have a direct impact upon the organi-
zational structure of an entity such as the IDF.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Thus far in establishing the framework, selected inputs to the com-
bat organization have been established. Now, a model will be offered
which will be used to show how the IDF has changed structurally over
time. The model to be used identifies six basic parts of any functional
organization. [Ref. 5:pp. 114-1161
1. Strategic Apex
The strategic apex is where the organization is managed or led
from a general perspective. In the military, the commander and his per-
sonal staff are the strategic apex and the position from which orders and
guidance are issued.
2. Middle Line
The middle line are those leaders in a direct line relationship
between the strategic apex and the operating core. This is the chain of
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command- those officers and non-commissioned officers crucial in any
military organization as a means to link plans and policy with output and
mission accomplishment.
3. Operating Core
The operating core is where the basic work of producing the
organization's products is accomplished. In the military, the operating
core is essentially the line unit and individual soldier- the fighting men
who close with and destroy the enemy.
4. Technostructure
The technostructure is the analysts who concern themselves
with advising and designing the systems by which outputs of others in
the organization are controlled. The technostructure in the military is
normally comprised of the planning staffs who work in support of line
unit operations.
5. Support Staff
The support staff provides advice and runs the various support
functions. These are the specialists who provide support to the organiza-
tion in conjunction with its normal combat operations.
6. Ideology
Ideology is the final part of any functioning organization. It sur-
rounds the entire organization and influences each of the other parts. It
is simply the set of beliefs and traditions which permeate the whole
organization. Military units use ideology as a means to rally morale and
esprit in difficult situations.
10
A schematic representation of the Mintzberg model is shown In










Figure 2. The Mintzberg Organizational Model
D. OUTPUTS OF THE SYSTEM
In the framework which has been established to this point, the com-
bat organization is an entity which is changing based upon a set of broad
system Inputs. As a result of these changes, the outputs of the system
vary. For a military organization such as the IDF, system outputs are its
warfighting capabilities. In analyzing the accomplishments of the IDF,
outputs will be analyzed using the Principles of War. As shown on the
schematic (Figure 1), these lessons learned flow back into the system and
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become inputs. This is because the IDF has shown a particular willing-
ness over time to examine lessons learned from previous wars and apply
them in making any structural organizational changes aimed at correct-
ing perceived weaknesses. This willingness to be self-critical, it will be
shown, has proven to be extremely beneficial to the IDF.
There are nine recognized principles of war. These principles have
withstood the test of time and will prove adequate to capture the lessons
learned from the wars of the IF. In the analysis of each of the Arab-
Israeli conflicts, those principles most affirmed or violated will be
discussed.
1. Objective
"Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, deci-
sive, and attainable objective." [Ref.6:p. B-li Military forces are extremely
mission oriented. The lack of clearly defined mission orders and attain-
able objectives causes confusion and disorder to the structure of any
military organization.
2. Offensive
"Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative." [Ref.6:p. B-21 A military
force which has lost the initiative has become decisively engaged. When
this happens, the engaged unit must react to the moves of the enemy
rather than seizing control of the situation.
3. Mass
"Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time." [Ref.
6:p. B-21 Historically, smaller armies have been able to defeat forces
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many times their size by the massing of forces at the key point in the
battle.
4. Economy of Force
"Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary
efforts." [Ref. 6:pp. B-2-B-3) This principle is the corollary to the princi-
ple of mass. Military leaders must sometimes accept risks in areas not
part of the main effort. This principle simply calls for the proper alloca-
tion of limited valuable resources.
5. Maneuver
"Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexi-
ble application of combat power." [Ref. 6:p. B-3] The freedom of a military
force to maneuver is simply the means of achieving mass and economy of
force as the commander determines. This principle calls for flexibility of
thoughts, plans, and operations. Maneuver is most often accomplished
by a commander who has the freedom of thought to take advantage of an
enemy weakness.
6. Unity of Command
"For every objective, insure unity of effort under one responsible
commander." [Ref. 6:pp. B-3-B-41 This principle is the essence of com-
mand and control. The commander must have the authority to assign
and direct his forces to the accomplishment of a given mission.
7. Security
"Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage."
[Ref. 6:p. B-4] Without proper security, a military force will not remain
effective in combat for long. Security is needed in all actions. Without it,
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compromise is assured along with an inability to achieve any given
objective.
8. Surprise
"Strike the enemy at a time and/or place and in [a] manner for
which he is unprepared." [Ref. 6:p. B-41 The reciprocal of security, a mili-
tary force should seek to exploit the enemy's lack of preparedness to
compromise his plans and destroy his forces.
9. Simplicity
"Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to
insure thorough understanding." [Ref. 6:p. B-5] Plans must be under-
stood down to the level of the soldier. Then, when the fog of war becomes
thickest, well-trained units can execute their orders based upon each
individual soldier's understanding of the mission and the commander's
intent.
E. THE ENVIRONMENT
Permeating the entire system which has been established to this
point is the environment, an admittedly broad term [Ref. 7:p. 2941 used
to describe the general conditions that surround an organization. The
degree to which the system's environment is complex or simple will
greatly influence organizational structure. In extremely complex envi-
ronments, the organization will tend to standardize more functions while
decentralizing authority for making decisions. In a similar fashion,
whether the environment is stable or dynamic will have an impact. A
dynamic (rapidly changing) environment may move an organization away
14
from reliance on standardization and toward mutual adjustment between
forces and leaders on the ground.
The term "variety" will be used to represent the possible states of
nature in which the organization must function. It will be shown that in
its early history the IDF operated in an environment almost entirely
devoid of variety. As time went on, the factors figuring into the organiza-
tional equation of the IDF became more complex. The tendency toward
increased environmental variety resulted in predictable responses on the
part of the IDF, particularly a noticeable move toward standardization of
process with a concurrent tendency toward decentralization of execution.
In some respects, the IDF chose to hold constant the dynamic nature of
its region and its place within it. The IDFs organizational reactions to its
environment will be fully explored in this thesis.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has established the framework for subsequent analysis
of the IDF. The combat organization, it has been shown, cannot be
viewed in isolation. Instead, it must be analyzed in terms of an open sys-
tem with inputs and outputs that change within an environment.
Resistance to change is, in the author's opinion, a problem in many
organizations. The IDF, it will be shown, has not only accepted change
but has actively sought to analyze and critique itself to correct perceived
shortcomings. This admirable trait has resulted in qualitative advantages
over quantitatively superior Arab forces.
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III. WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
A. SITUATION
The United Nations General Assembly voted on November 29, 1947
to end the British Mandate over Palestine and to divide this disputed ter-
ritory into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an international zone [Ref.
8 :p. 27) which included the holy city of Jerusalem. This action at the UN
triggered the Israeli War of Independence, a bloody struggle for the exis-
tence of a Jewish homeland that would be a precursor of conflicts to
follow.
The Jewish defense forces which existed in Palestine at the conclu-
sion of the Second World War were factionalized and lacking in central
authority. The largest of the factions, the Haganah, would ultimately
provide the framework for the Israeli Defense Forces of today. Born out of
the conclusion of WW I in 1920, the Haganah was a clandestine organi-
zation throughout its existence. This force was an acknowledgement by
the Jewish leadership in Palestine at the time that conflict with the Arabs
was inevitable and must be prepared for. Thus, the Haganah spent much
of its time in the 1920s and 1930s seeking the assistance of Jews
abroad, recruiting men, raising funds, and obtaining weapons. [Ref.
9:p. 81
Arab terrorist attacks in 1929 led the Haganah leadership to estab-
lish defensive plans on a national scale. This was accomplished by
16
designating each isolated Jewish settlement as a defensive stronghold.
[Ref. 10:p. 211
In 1943, the charter of the Haganah was changed, "...speaking not of
a popular militia, but of an organization that was a stage in the develop-
ment of a national defense force." [Ref. 9: p. 91 This new charter estab-
lished the structure of today's IDF, calling for men and women aged 17
and older to serve in the miljtary for a period of two years.
Additional factions included the Palmach, organized in 1941 and
originally meant to be a defense force against the Germans while so
many of the Jewish youth were away from the homeland fighting for the
British. Described as a youth movement in arms, the Palmach sought to
make full use of group cohesion and combat leadership at all levels. They
compensated for small size and lack of heavy weapons [Ref. 8:p. 211 with
highly trained individual soldiers and daring small-unit tactics. Smaller
but extremely powerful factions included the ETZEL and LEHI. These two
organizations were opposed to the Haganah's stated policy of restraint.
They were vehemently opposed to British occupation of Palestine and
carried out brutal terrorist missions aimed at driving them out.
At the time of the UN resolution, intermittent small-scale conflicts
had been the norm between the Arabs and the Jews of Palestine. The
new order, as expressed through this resolution, led to full-scale war.
B. ENEMY FORCES
The enemy which faced the Jews at the start of the War of Indepen-
dence was significantly different than the enemy they would face by its
conclusion. At the start, the Arabs were a loose collection of factions
17
which operated on an ad hoc basis. Included among their factions were
6,000 local Arabs who had acquired training in the British Army, 3,000
Arabs who had been members of the British Palestinian police, and some
6,000 volunteer soldiers from surrounding Arab nations. The Arab forces,
although poorly organized, were well equipped with weaponry from Bri-
tain and France. [Ref. 1 1:p. 50]
By the end of the War of Independence, the IDF would face the
combined standing armies of five Arab nations: Syria, Egypt, Lebanon,
Jordan, and Iraq. Well armed, these forces were trained and sometimes
led by British [Ref. 12 :p. 231 professionals.
C. FRIENDLY FORCES
At the start of the war, the Jewish forces were somewhat comparable
in numbers to their Arab counterparts. The Haganah [Ref. 9:p. 221 con-
sisted of 9,500 men, the Palmach 2,100, the ETZEL and LEHI 4,000.
What the Israelis lacked in sheer numbers they made up for in terms of
leadership, organization, and iron resolve to fight to the death.
A severe disadvantage at the start of the war was the lack of modem,
functional weapons. Indeed, the strikingly low quantities of weapons [Ref.
1 1:p. 581 included 17,000 rifles, 3,500 submachine guns, 160 medium
machine guns, 670 light mortars, and nine light aircraft with only 40
trained pilots. Israel's lack of allies in the world was a handicap because
no nation seemed willing to support what looked in 1947 to be a losing
cause.
As the war proceeded, however, a rather strange relationship devel-
oped between Israel and Czechoslovakia. The Czechs [Ref. 9:p. 271 began
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to supply the Israelis with modern weaponry, apparently with the
approval of Stalin. This arms pipeline significantly enhanced the IDF's
fighting capability and may well have turned the war in its favor.
D. OPERATIONS
The War of Independence [Ref. 9:pp. 24-311 was fought in three
stages. Stage one occurred between December 1947 and March 1948.
This phase was largely an intensification of the sniping and sabotage
which had been occurring between the Arabs and the Jews for decades.
This part of the war became known as the "battle of the roads" due to the
Arab tactic of isolating Jewish settlements and cutting off attempts at
resupply. [Ref. 11:p. 41]
The initial response of the Jewish leadership was to assume a defen-
sive orientation within the settlements. Above all, there would be no
withdrawal. The leadership felt that any hint of capitulation from the
settlements could seriously, maybe fatally, injure the efforts of holding
the spirit of the new nation together. The Jews attempted to regain con-
tact with the isolated villages through the use of convoys. Bloody
ambushes were [Ref. 9:p. 251 often the result and the Jews suffered
losses approaching 1,200 dead. This phase of the war ended with the
Jews acknowledging the need to take the offensive, a lesson they would
recall often.
Stage two of the war began with the first large-scale offensive by the
Jews. On April 5, 1948, Operation Nahshon was undertaken with the
main objective to secure the road to Jerusalem. This operation marked
the first mission of greater than company size and was partially
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successful in freeing the road, although the Arabs countered with large-
scale operations of their own. [Ref. 12:pp. 30-311
The Haganah's establishment of strategic depth through the use of
the settlements was tested during this phase. The settlements fought val-
iantly and affirmed the willingness of the Israeli people to fight in defense
of their territory. The price paid in blood was high, however, with another
1,253 killed and several settlements destroyed. [Ref. 9:p. 281
The declaration on May 14, 1948 by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion
calling for the establishment of the State of Israel brought the second
stage of the war to an end. It was the beginning of the unified Israeli
Defense Force, however, as Ben-Gurion moved to unite the various fac-
tions into one coherent fighting force under one general headquarters
and staff. The Palmach command and staff were integrated into the
structure of the Haganah but the three Palmach brigades were left Intact.
The ETZEL and the LEHI would follow, although not without consider-
able resistance. All soldiers took an oath of allegiance to the state, an
official uniform was created, and for the first time ranks were established
for the NCOs and officers. [Ref. 9: p. 301
Stage three of the war began with the simultaneous invasion [Ref.
3:p. 491 of the Arab armies, as depicted in Figure 3. The declaration of
Ben-Gurion, coupled with the humiliating failures of the Arab irregulars,
led to the Invasion. The Arab armies, although intent on destroying
Israel, lacked coordinated action. Indeed, conflicts internal to the Arabs
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Upon the invasion, the Israelis mobilized another 30,000 [Ref. 1 1:p.
511 reservists and called for foreign volunteers to assist. These volun-
teers, many of whom had fought for the Allies in WW II, were assigned to
the MAHAL. They provided a wealth of professional and technical assis-
tance to the fledgling army. The spirit of the Israelis was called upon by
Ben-Gurion, who said.
We will not win by military might alone. Even if we could field a
larger army, we could not stand. The most important thing is moral
and intellectual strength. [Ref. 9: p. 32]
Once again, Israel relied upon the strength of the settlements to
delay the advancing armies. The settlements proved to be extremely effec-
tive. The delaying action gave the IDF enough time to consolidate, plan,
and launch operations to drive the invaders back.
The Egyptian army of 2,750 men, (some five battalions) was the
largest [Ref. 9:p. 351 of the invading forces. They attacked on two prongs,
toward Tel Aviv on one and toward Beershaba in the Negev desert on the
other. The settlements fought valiantly and caused the Egyptians to
expend a great deal of their fighting strength in advancing. Their attack
was halted only 20 miles from Tel Aviv.
A one-month truce [Ref. 9:p. 391 was called on June 11, 1948 by the
United Nations. During this month, the IDF planned, rearmed, and reor-
ganized. The Arabs did not make such effective use of this time. [Ref.
8:p. 38]
At the conclusion of the cease-fire, the IDF began Operation DONI,
consisting of a four-brigade offensive to drive the Egyptians from Tel Aviv.
This was the IDF's largest offensive operation and led to the taking of
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Lydda airport. A second truce was called on July 19 at the height of the
offensive. By this time, the Israelis knew that the Arab alliance had dis-
solved; when one of the Arab armies was attacked, no one came to its
assistance. [Ref. 9: p. 40]
E. RESULTS
The final period of the war began on October 10, 1948. No longer
was Israel outnumbered. At the peak of its fighting, Israel had mobilized
an army of 120,000. Weapons were available and the IDF could count
some 60,000 rifles, 220 artillery pieces, and 7,000 vehicles of various
types. [Ref. 9: p. 40]
The IDF had evolved throughout the war. It had begun to look like a
seasoned army with ranks and clearly defined command structure. In
contrast, the Arabs had degenerated into peasant armies, poorly led and
barely resupplied. The IDF sensed this disarray and mounted three major
operations, two in the south and one in the north. The objective of each
was to drive the invaders out from the established boundaries of Israel.
[Ref. I l:p. 54]
The major thrust and arguably the finest operation conducted by the
IDF in the war was Operation Yoav. This operation began with armed
attacks by Israeli fighters on Egyptian planes stationed at airfields. Three
brigades opened the offensive and were later joined by a fourth and a
battalion of armor. Planning was done with the assumption that no other
Arab armies would move to assist the Egyptians. During this operation,
the IDF conducted diversionary action such as having forces from the
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settlements, long cut off from resupply, attack the Egyptian supply lines
from the rear. [Ref. 1 1:p. 541
The War of Independence ended with a political settlement rather
than a military one. Great Britain had threatened to invoke a long-
standing defense pact with Egypt if Israel did not stay within its borders
and allow the Egyptian army to retreat. The United States strongly
encouraged Israel to heed the warnings of the British. [Ref. 1 1:p. 561
Israel did comply, much to-the consternation of the leadership of the
IDF. Chief of Staff Allon sent a strong message to the General Headquar-
ters: "I am shocked by the withdrawal orderl This is the second time that
we are throwing away a certain chance of inflicting a final defeat on the
Egyptian enemy." [Ref. 9:p. 421
This was the first opportunity for the Israelis to learn that in order to
achieve victory in the political arena, they must succeed militarily. Never
again would they be in a position to admit, as Allon had in 1948, "...we
won the war, but lost the peace." [Ref. 9:p. 441
F. ANALYSIS
1. Inputs to the System
The emergence of the IDF as an organization took place amidst
the turmoil of a new nation in danger of being decimated by well-armed
neighbors. Interestingly, the leadership at the time in Israel, although
under enormous pressures and imminent danger, was able to establish a
framework for national defense which still exists today. The environmen-
tal factors most responsible for influencing the original organizational
structure of the IDF included the threat faced and the social and
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economic factors in Israel. The doctrine which the IDF adopted at the
time was driven largely by the urgency of the moment, lack of adequate
weaponry, and insufficient resources (including manpower).
a. The Threat
Although there was little disagreement among the senior
leadership of Israel that the survival of the state was in danger, the
nature of the threat was in question. While some felt that massive inva-
sion by regular Arab armies was possible, it was equally likely that inter-
nal problems from local Palestinians were the real threat. The primacy of
Ben-Gurion was evident in this debate, however, and it was his feeling
that a clash with the Arab regulars was inevitable. Thus, he insisted on
structuring the IDF along conventional military lines. [Ref. 11 :p. 371
b. Socio-Economic Factors
One of the most pressing concerns of Ben-Gurion was find-
ing a means by which to subordinate the various factions of the military
prior to statehood into one centrally controlled force. More specifically,
the problem was in establishing a political structure which would con-
vince the factions to subordinate their own interests for the greater good
of the state. It was these concerns that were the genesis of the integrated
nature [Ref. 4:p. 6] of the IDF. There is no truly seperate air force, navy,
or army. Instead, one military chief of staff was designated to oversee the
operational and planning responsibilities for the entire IDF. As one
author points out, [Tihe integrated services in the IDF are a reflection of
its history, of the need to bring under political control competing military
forces whose conflicts reach back to pre-independence days." [Ref. 4:p. 81
25
c. IDF Fighting Doctrine
While the initial disposition taken by the Israelis was defen-
sive in orientation, a doctrine relying on mobility was clearly a desire of
doctrinal planners. Indeed, Israel's lack of strategic depth precluded any
thought of fighting a protracted defensive struggle. When the IDF
armored corps was not ready to assume a dominant role in taking the
offensive against the Arabs, the emphasis shifted to the infantry soldier.
The early IDF focused on training its ground forces to negate the fire-
power advantage of the enemy [Ref. 13:p. 23] through the use of stealth
and darkness, concentrating on taking objectives with superior close-
fighting skills. It was believed that this approach would negate the ene-
my's inherent qualitative material advantages.
2. Organizational Structure
The IDF in its infancy in 1948 was nonetheless a functioning,
viable organization. Applying the Mintzberg model in a retrospective
fashion to the force structure begins to reveal the framework of the
modem IDF.
a. Strategic Apex
In the author's opinion, the strategic apex of the IDF during
the War of Independence consisted of one man, Prime Minister David
Ben-Gurion. The dual challenge and inherent power of being the individ-
ual charged with forming a coherent defense force and a national gov-
ernment resulted in his predominance.
Ben-Gurion was not a professional military officer. He cen-
tered his strategy of fighting the Arab invaders and preserving Israel's
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territorial integrity around a policy of allowing no retreat in any of the
settlements. Largely successful, his tone of defiance and strength was
adopted in the IDF as well as in the civilian population. The Prime Minis-
ter was aided, upon consolidation of the factionalized defense forces, by
the newly created General Staff and Headquarters, which helped to set
overall strategic objectives.
b. Middle Line
The officer corps of the IDF adopted the method of com-
mand that it has retained to the present. They chose to lead their soldiers
from the front-pulling their soldiers as opposed to pushing them into
battle. The price of this command philosophy is steep. Officer casualties
were disproportionately high in the IDF then and are so now. [Ref. 4:p.
281
A story told in all Israeli officer courses recounts a battle
which occurred during Operation Nahshon (April 1948). A Jewish com-
pany forced to withdraw from the hilltop village Kastel was about to be
overrun. The commander knew that the only chance of saving at least a
portion of his unit was to leave a rear guard to allow the others to with-
draw. He issued what has become a legendary order in the IDF: "All pri-
vates will retreat, all commanders will cover their withdrawal." [Ref. 8:p.
61] The commander was killed along with his platoon leaders. [Ref.
8:p. 611
c. Operating Core
The undeniable strength of the IDF during the War of Inde-
pendence lay in the strength and courage of the individual fighting
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soldier. Although heavily outgunned and outnumbered, these soldiers
were able to consistently defeat their Arab enemies. Use of stealth, night-
fighting skills, and hand-to-hand combat allowed the IDF to overcome
numerical advantages.
The IDF of 1948 was like no other army in the world. Indi-
vidual soldier discipline was poor, there was no standardized uniform,
and rank structure was informal at best. One source stated that
"[Orders were commonly formulated after open debate in which rank
carried less weight than sound arguments, and could rarely be imposed
by the sheer authority of superior rank." [Ref. 8:p. 541 Yet, as a fighter,
the IDF soldier proved extremely efficient. In large measure, this could be
attributed to the leadership's belief that the smallest unit is the single
man with his rifle. The fact that these soldiers were fighting, quite liter-
ally, for their families' and nation's survival surely affected their
performance.
d. Supporting Structure
As with the combat units, the supporting structure of the
IDF evolved throughout the War of Independence. At the start of the war,
soldiers carried all necessary supplies literally on their backs. By the
war's conclusion, mechanized warfare on a national scale resulted in the
development of an embryonic logistical support system.
Similarly, as the IDF became more organized, the mobiliza-
tion system began to take shape. No nation in the world can claim a
higher per capita involvement of its citizens in the military. During the
War of Independence, the IDF was able to mobilize 120,000 soldiers at
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the peak of the fighting. Conscription was extended to the middle aged as
well as to young men and women. Initially, women participated in com-
bat, but they were eventually withdrawn to perform vital support roles.
This reserve system was institutionalized in the Israeli way of life during
and after the war. [Ref. 9:p. 48]
e. Technostructure
This is the most difficult part of the 1948 IDF to identify
and analyze. The technostructure was an informal entity at the time as,
by necessity, the task of designing the organization's structure and out-
puts was accomplished by commanders on the ground adapting to the
rapidly changing situation. A prime example would be the brigade com-
manders' complaint to the General Headquarters about a lack of respon-
siveness that was hampering their ability to exploit tactical opportunities.
These complaints led to the establishment of a new echelon of command
-the front commanders- as a means of addressing the concerns of the
brigade commanders. [Ref. 1 1:p. 671
f. Ideology
Having just survived the devestating effects of the Holo-
caust, the Jewish people understood the consequences of defeat. One
facet of the ideology which pervades the IDF is a phenomenon known as
-Jewish memory," which is sometimes used to explain the intense feel-
ings that Jews can muster for atrocities and transgressions against them
and their ancestors. Ideology was born of memory, as expressed in the
following dialogue from a book by Leon Uris (a well-known author of the
Jewish experience):
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I think this time they are not going to forget. Jews have a long mem-
ory. They weep for temples lost two thousand years and they repeat
old wives' stories of liberations and rituals from the dawn of time. Do
you know what an old Jew rabbi told me once when I asked him
about Jewish memory? What? The words "I believe" mean "I remem-
ber." Even Nietzsche is puzzled over their ability to outlive everyone
who has tried to destroy them. I believe.. .I remember. So you see,
Alfred, a thousand years from now old Jews will wail in remem-
brance of the Nazi pharaoh who held them in bondage in Warsaw.
[Ref. 14:pp. 457-4581
In the author's opinion, it might prove worthy for the Arab nations to
remember that the Jews never forget.
3. Outputs of the System
a. Unity of Command
The command and control capabilities of the IDF improved
as the war continued. The unification by Ben-Gurion of the various Jew-
ish defense factions was a necessary and important step. The General
Headquarters (GHQ) became the "...source of all strategic direction with a
full complement of Intelligence, Logistic, and Operational staffs." [Ref.
8:p. 53 1 Initially, the GHQ proved to be somewhat unresponsive to the
needs of the various brigade commanders. This led to the establishment
of front commanders who were responsible for routine decisions, freeing
GHQ to focus on strategic planning and national issues. The addition of
the various front commanders allowed for greater flexibility and exploited
the tendency for Israeli commanders to take the initiative. [Ref. 1 1:p. 671
While the IDF of 1948 defies easy categorization, a method
of command and control began to emerge. Based upon the principle of
maintenance of the objective, this C2 method called for maximum flexi-
bility and authority at the junior leader level. It is a system that
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acknowledges that the commander most able to make the correct tactical
decisions is the one on the ground, closest to the action. This decentrali-
zation of decision making allows for rapid response on the battlefield,
allowing the IDF leadership to get inside the decision cycle of the enemy.
Emerging in the aftermath of the War of Independence was
a willingness for introspection by Israeli leaders. Arel Sharon, then a
young commander, summarized this tendency to be self-critical: "...I
could not get out of my mind the conviction that these operations could
have been handled differently...." [Ref. 3:p. 671 The IDF established early
in its history this pattern of analyzing actions and making changes as
necessary.
b. Offensive
The initial period of the war, the "Battle of the Roads," did
not go well for the Israelis, primarily due to the defensive orientation they
had assumed. While their settlements fought valiantly, there was little
chance of winning by maintaining this defensive posture.
The war turned with the start of large-scale offensive opera-
tions such as Nahshon. This was the first time Jewish forces actually
took the offensive and moved to seize territory. This operation succeeded
in securing the road to Jerusalem, if only temporarily. More lasting was
the fact that this minor success helped transform the basic orientation of
the IDF from a purely defensive force to one that sought to exploit offen-
sive opportunities.
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c. Economy of Force
The ability of the isolated Jewish settlements to delay the
advancing Arab armies was an excellent example of economy of force.
Only limited resources were devoted to the settlements, allowing the IDF
time to consolidate and organize its valuable manpower and equipment.
d. Mass
During Operation Yoav, the Israelis exploited this principle.
By massing four infantry brigades and a battalion of armor, the IDF was
able to penetrate the Egyptian lines and break into the Negev desert. This
action, a coordinated combined arms operation, was significant in that it
succeeded as a result of centralized planning combined with aggressive,
decentralized execution.
e. Maneuver
From a strategic perspective, the IDF was able to win its
War of Independence because of its ability to create defense in depth
where none existed geographically. By using each of the Jewish settle-
ments as defensive positions, the IDF forced the advancing Arab armies
to expend valuable time and resources. Its use of civilians as soldiers was
a piece of the framework which would help establish the IDF as one of
the world's most ready and capable fighting forces.
On a tactical level, this war reaffirmed B. H. Liddel Hart's
concept [Ref. 8:p. 64] of the indirect approach. Despite being outnum-
bered and outgunned, the Israeli infantry soldier was able to defeat his
Arab counterpart. The IDF took maximum advantage of terrain, night
operations, and surprise to close with and fight the Arabs in close
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combat, negating their enemy's firepower superiority. Armor forces, in
contrast, had an insignificant role in this war. What armor was available
was obsolete and poorly employed. In essence, when used, the tanks
acted as infantry support vehicles, not as a separate combat arm.
The introduction of the Israeli Air Force was a morale
boost, if not a tactically significant event. The IAF was able to fend off
Egyptian air raids against Tel Aviv and inflict some minor damage on
Arab capitals. [Ref. 1 1:p. 66]
G. THE ENVIRONMENT
The environment which existed around the IDF as an organization
during the War of Independence was, in the author's opinion, simple but
dynamic. Events in the region were changing rapidly. This conclusion is
based upon evaluating the level of variety, or possible states of nature,
existing within system inputs such as the threat, technology, and socio-
economic factors. The simplicity of the system is reflected in the extreme
centralization which was implemented at the strategic apex in the form of
one man, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. It can also be seen in the
almost complete lack of standardization within the IDF at the time. Inci-
dents such as the brigade commanders getting together and demanding
a front commander to coordinate their actions are vivid examples of the
search for some basic level of standardization. While the environment
was simple, it was also quite dynamic in nature. This was a period of
tremendous uncertainty in Israeli political, economic, social, and military
institutions. This dynamism led the IDF to achieve flexibility of
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operations through mutual adjustment among commanders on the
ground as well as rigid, direct supervision within the chain of command.
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IV. THE 1956 SINAI CAMPAIGN
A. SITUATION
The Sinai campaign, known in Israel as Operation Kadesh, began on
October 29, 1956. Since the end of the 1948 war, Egypt had adopted a
policy of supporting fedayeen (self-sacrificers) raids against civilian tar-
gets inside of Israel. These raids had been met by IDF reprisals
conducted by the paratroop brigade of Ariel Sharon. While largely suc-
cessfull, these reprisals did little to alter or diminish the raids of the
fedayeen. This background of conflict was coupled with two other signifi-
cant events which would lead Israel to war with Egypt. The first event
came on October 27, 1955, when Egypt's President Nasser announced a
huge arms transaction with the communist bloc. This massive transfu-
sion of Soviet weapons not only upset the precarious regional balance of
power, it also looked like the beginning of increased communist influence
in the region. [Ref. 15:p. 1321
Secondly, Nasser decided on July 27, 1956 to nationalize the Suez
canal, a major source of trade [Ref. 12:p. 113] and transport in the Mid-
dle East as well as for the world. This action resulted in the military
coalition of the French and the British, who, along with Israel, were
determined to protect their national interests in the region.
B. ENEMY FORCES
Prior to the aforementioned communist arms shipments to Egypt,
there had existed a rough balance of power between Israel and Egypt.
35
Both, for example, had maintained approximately 200 tanks. The infu-
sion of arms from the Czechoslovakians (the Soviets did not want to be
directly linked) significantly changed this balance. Sent to Egypt were
530 armored vehicles, 500 heavy guns, 150 MiG fighter planes, 50
Iluyshin-28 bombers, submarines, and naval craft. Along with the hard-
ware came Soviet technicians and instructors into Egypt. The sudden
buildup of capability caused Israel to consider a preemptive strike,
attacking before all the new eqfipment could be fully integrated into the
Egyptian forces. [Ref. 9:pp. 88-891
C. FRIENDLY FORCES
The strange alliance which evolved between Israel, France, and the
British is beyond the scope of this thesis to detail. It is sufficient to point
out, however, that each nation Joined the alliance out of pure self-
interest, and a great deal of mutual distrust and suspicion haunted them
throughout the campaign. [Ref. 15:pp. 140-1411
France agreed to supply Israel with some desperately needed arms
[Ref. 1 1:p. 1001, including 100 AMX-13 light mobile tanks with a medium
velocity 75 mm cannon, 150 heavy guns, 150 renovated U.S. half-tracks,
60 French M-50 howitzers, and approximately 60 M4A3 modified Sher-
man tanks. These weapons, while not matching the Egyptians in sheer
numbers, at least gave the IDF increased firepower and allowed it to fit
two reserve brigades with armor.
The IDF at this point consisted of 45,000 men and women formed
into 16 brigades, broken down as follows: one paratroop brigade, three
armor brigades, and 13 infantry brigades. Although it had established an
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Armor Corps Headquarters in 1953, the IDF remained an infantry-
centered force. The typical infantry brigade was triangularly constructed
with three rifle battalions, a heavy mortar company, a reconnaissance
company, a signal platoon, an engineer platooon, and an anti-tank
platoon. [Ref. 11:p. 102]
D. OPERATIONS
Operation Kadesh, in the author's opinion, was well planned and
executed by the IDF. The plan centered on the use of the indirect
approach, avoiding frontal attacks against the Egyptians and relying on
maneuver to confuse the enemy and drive him from established positions
in the Sinai. The concept of the operation is depicted in Figure 4. [Ref.
3:p. 152]
The operation began on 29 October with a battalion of paratroopers
dropped just 45 miles from the canal zone. While this force dug in, the
remainder of the paratroop brigade led by Sharon crossed the Sinai to
effect a link-up. Dayan adopted this risky plan because he felt it suited
the character of the IDF and its officers:
To a commander of an Israeli unit I can point to a map of the Suez
Canal and say "There is your target and this is your axis of advance.
Don't signal me during the fighting for more men, arms or vehicles.
All that we could allocate you've already got, and there isn't any
more." [Ref. 16:p. 259]
Meanwhile, Israeli fighter aircraft used their propellers to cut telephone
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control. Confusion [Ref. 9:p. 95] in the Egyptian high command was such
that almost a full day passed before they were aware of the scope of the
Israeli attack.
The IDF had deployed nine brigades on the Egyptian front [Ref. 9:p.
95). The remaining brigades were deployed against Syria and Jordan
should either decide to enter the war. Each brigade was given mission
orders and objectives to take and was given only minimal guidance from
General Headquarters. Most accomplished their missions with ease. The
7th Armored Brigade [Ref. 8:p. 151] was particularly effective and caused
the key penetrations into the Egyptian lines.
The French and British portion of the Sinai campaign, Operation
Musketeer, was largely ineffectual.
E. RESULTS
Upon realizing that he faced not only the IDF but French and British
military forces as well. Nasser ordered the withdrawal of Egyptian forces
from the Sinai. Thus, on November 2, Israeli forces were perched on the
Suez canal in the north and in the center, their route complete. The cost
to the IDF had been 172 killed. [Ref. 1 l:p. 109]
Superpower intervention was forthcoming as Moscow threatened to
take steps if all forces did not withdraw from the Sinai immediately. The
Israelis sought assurances from the United States that certain security
concerns would be addressed upon their withdrawal, including elimina-
tion of military bases in the Gaza strip and access to shipping Li the
straits. The U.S. was upset at her allies [Ref. 17:p. 7] for undertaking this
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operation but agreed with Israel's security concerns. Israel's forces with-
drew, destroying Egyptian fortifications as they went.
F. ANALYSIS
1. Inputs to the System
The years following the War of Independence were a time of
tremendous change within Israel and the IDF. The existence of the state
was by no means assured at this point and the role of the IDF was evolv-
ing. The nature of the defense policy was based upon the ever-present
threat, social and economic factors, and the doctrinal approach adopted
by IDF senior leadership.
a. Socio-Economic Factors
The requirements inherent in nation building precluded
Israel from maintaining a large standing force [Ref. 1 1:p. 711 and resulted
in the 1949 passage of the Defence Service Law. The essence of this law
called for
... the intensive exploitation of the entire national manpower pool
through the universal conscription of men and women, coupled with
a long reserve obligation, and utilization of almost all state-
supported activities: transportation, hospitals, communications, and
construction, for dual military-civilian functions. [Ref. 1 1:p. 711
Additionally, this law called for soldiers, after completion of thei: basic
training, to devote 12 months of their service time to agricultural endeav-
ors. This soldier-farmer concept met with heated objections on the part of
senior military leaders, who felt it would detract from the readiness of the
IDF. [Ref. 9:pp. 58-591
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The first three years of Jewish statehood saw the popula-
tion double, although most of the immigrants were penniless, unedu-
cated, and unskilled. This caused a great strain on the Israeli economy
and strict rationing ensued. The IDF did not escape the austerity. Low
pay, inadequate housing, and lousy equipment combined to produce a
defense force of extremely low morale. [Ref. 11 :p. 76]
b. Threat
Although the War of Independence had been a clear victory
for the Israelis, their precarious position among their Arab neighbors
improved little. The threat faced by the IDF in the years immediately fol-
lowing the war changed from invasion by massed Arab armies to infiltra-
tion by bands of armed marauders. Israel shares borders [Ref. 1 1:p. 691
with four hostile neighbors: 330 miles with Jordan, 165 with Egypt, 47
with Syria, and 49 with Lebanon. The inability of Israel to protect its bor-
ders against incursion led to the establishment of the reprisal policy,
which was aimed at "...deterring Arab governments from allowing or
encouraging attacks on Israeli territory." [Ref. 8:p. 106]
c. Doctrinal Approach
The military doctrine of the IDF in the years after the War
of Independence was largely a reflection of Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan's
predisposition towards infantry forces. It was said that "...he confused
mere physical mobility with actual tactical mobility in the presence of
enemy fire- he therefore regarded the slow and heavy tank as a hin-
drance." [Ref. 8:p. 1181 Additionally, his almost total emphasis on the
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fighting units led to a serious neglect of the combat support elements.
[Ref. 8 :p. 1181
Tactically, the IDF soldiers continued to hone their skills as
night fighters and masters of stealth. They did learn the dangers of pre-
dictability, however, as Sharon's paratrooper tactics were routine and
nearly cost them on more than one occasion. [Ref. 3:pp. 133-1531
2. Organizational Structure
a. Strategic Apex -
Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan was a flamboyant, charismatic
leader who had a tremendous influence on the IDF as an organization.
His focus was always on the primacy of the combat mission of the IDF-
on the product, not the process. Dayan was not concerned with what
might be called soldier disciplines. Instead, he sought to mold a tough
and aggressive fighting machine. He strove to make the IDF flexible,
swift, and unhampered by what he saw as rigid military routine. [Ref.
11:p. 91]
There is little evidence that Dayan worked within the struc-
ture of the GHQ. Instead, he seemed to believe that he could best influ-
ence the battle by being on the ground with his subordinates. [Ref. 18:p.
197]
b. Middle Line
The IDF was founded on the initiative and capabilities of its
Junior leaders. Decentralization of authority was the watchword of IDF
command and control philosophy. Some actions during the Sinai cam-
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paign signalled the need for a balance of a more centralized higher level
of command. Dayan said that
... the heavy emphasis on improvisation and the absence of a strong
controlling hand meant that "our capacity for misadventure is limit-
less," including several cases in which Israeli units fired at each
other or were strafed by Israeli aircraft. [Ref. 18:p. 196]
Sharon, for example, engaged in a bloody, needless battle at the Mitla
pass after having been specifically ordered to stay away. His insubordina-
tion was shrugged off by Dayan as aggressive leadership but led to an
inquiry and a more active role by the GHQ in monitoring and influencing
IDF tactical commanders. [Ref. 3:p. 1511
c. Operating Core
The Sinai campaign validated the IDF's reserve system.
Men and women reservists were mobilized only days before the attack
and performed well. There had been considerable concern that the
reservists would be unable to make the transition from their civilian
activities to a combat-ready status. These concerns proved unfounded.
[Ref. 9:p. 941
d. Supporting Structure
At this juncture, the supporting structure of the IDF was
weak. Mobilization plans called for reservists to report with civilian vehi-
cles to support the war effort. The problem was that many of these vehi-
cles were hardly roadworthy, and as a result battlefield mobility was
hindered. [Ref. 9:p. 98]
A workable system of maintenance had yet to be imple-
mented. Spare parts were extremely difficult to find. Indeed, as Sharon
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moved to link up with his battalion of paratroopers, no tools were avail-
able to repair flat tires. Thus, any disabled vehicles had to be abandoned.
[Ref. 8 :p. 1471
e. Technostructure
The technostructure of the IDF was still not formalized in
1956. The General Staff was in place but ineffectual once the war began.
Left out of the picture by Dayan, the planning staffs were reduced to
monitoring the battle through secondhand sources.
f . Ideology
The religious factor has played a significant part in the
ideology which has permeated the IDF since its beginnings. While every
warring faction would invoke the Deity, it is really only Israel which can
point specifically to tacti .'al instructions given as the Word of God to the
people of Israel. Indeed the Bible acts as a sort of field manual in the IDF
(many Army texts quote the Bible to make a point) and "...serves as a
common point of reference." [Ref. 19:p. 361 These biblical roots are a
fundamental aspect of Israel's sense of self-preservation.
3. Organizational Outputs
a. Unity of Command
While the results of the operation were largely what the IDF
had planned, the command and control structure showed some serious
deficiencies during the Sinai campaign. While it is difficult to argue
against the concept of leading from the front, Dayan may have carried it
to extremes during this war. He chose to fight the battle with forward
units, putting himself effectively out of communications [Ref. 9:p. 981
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with GHQ and the Cabinet for long periods of time. Information was
spotty at best at GHQ, and returning IAF pilots were often the only
source of reports. Thus, the role of higher headquarters in this war was
reduced to establishing objectives, targets, and timetables and then
anticipating the results. In the author's opinion, while decentralization of
command authority is a proper goal, it must be countered with a mea-
sure of control from higher headquarters. The IDF realized this after the
war and took steps to solidify a workable command and control struc-
ture. What evolved was the concept of optional control which would work
quite well in the 1967 Six-Day War.
b. Maneuver
Prior to the Sinai campaign, the IDF had attempted to
define the role of the tank in its force structure. What evolved from those
discussions was a feeling that the tank was best suited as a support
vehicle for infantry forces. The feeling was that the tank was mechani-
cally unreliable and was vulnerable if it fought massed as a separate
combat arm.
Operationally, this war caused considerable reflection
inside the IDF on how best to accomplish national strategic objectives.
The result of this self-analysis was the transition from an Infantry-
dominated force to one which incorporated the tremendous tactical
advantages of the tank. As a result of the success of the 7th Brigade in
the 1956 war, the IDF leadership reevaluated the proper role of armor.
They decided that, instead of acting as infantry support vehicles, armor
added tremendous maneuverability on the battlefield. The tank was not
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only a weapons platform but also had the protection to close with enemy
armor and destroy heavily fortified positions. Once the IDF leadership
resolved the role of armor, it did so with great fervor: "Dayan's ability to
change his mind without regret or fear of losing face thus enabled him to
replace misguided theory with correct practice." [Ref. 16:p. 2631 The tank
became the centerpiece of the IDF and would work with infantry in
support.
c. Objective
The objectives adopted by the IDF in this war were summed
up by Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan: "...to confound the organization of
Egyptian forces in Sinai and bring about their collapse." [Ref. 8:p. 1421
Dayan's strategy was to avoid any battles of attrition with the Egyptians
and to use the indirect approach to bring about victory. It was a cam-
paign of large-scale raids designed to outmaneuver the Egyptians and cut
off their lines of communication. This strategic way of thinking has with-
stood the test of time and effectively remains Israel's policy today: take
the offensive, fight short wars, and rely heavily on the reserve system.
[Ref. 20:p. 9]
Prior to undertaking the Sinai campaign, the IDF estab-
lished three [Ref. 15:p. 148] military objectives: destruction of the feday-
een bases in Egypt and along the Sinai border, elimination of Egyptian
offensive potential by eliminating her Sinai infrastructure, and opening
the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. By establishing definable national
objectives, commanders at the tactical level were able to make decisions
that supported these goals. For example, a decision was made to
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minimize the number of Egyptian soldiers killed. Enemy dead, it was felt,
were not only easily replaceable but were unecessary to achieve stated
objectives. Instead, maneuver and surprise were chosen as the best
manner to achieve the mission. [Ref. 1 1:p. 106]
d. Surprise
The IDF was able to achieve surprise through the use of
decoys and feints. On a national level, it resisted mobilizing the reserves
until three days prior to the war. Additionally, all indications pointed to
an IDF attack against Jordan, not Egypt. On a tactical level, dropping
paratroopers deep into the Egyptian rear gave the illusion that the IDF
action was simply another reprisal against the fedayeen raids. It was
almost a full day before the Egyptian leadership was able to piece
together the magnitude of the IDF operation. [Ref. 16:p. 2601
G. THE ENVIRONMENT
Although this was the first of the truly modem wars of Israel, the
environment remained relatively simple but, at this juncture, had also
stabilized somewhat. These environmental conditions were a contributor
to an IDF that was much more formalized and centralized as an organi-
zation, at least relative to 1948. Each unit was "...self contained, carrying
with them all they will need to reach their final targets, and not be
dependent on outside supplies." [Ref. 18:p. 1961 Yet, there was little
integration of units and brigade commanders operated "...as if the Gen-
eral Headquarters did not exist...." [Ref. 18:p. 1971 The IDF was solely
focused, in the author's opinion, on current operations or the immediacy
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of the moment, a characteristic common to organizations in simple and
stable environments.
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V. THE SIX-DAY WAR
A. SITUATION
The aftermath of the 1956 Sinai campaign was a period of relative
calm [Ref. 1:p. 145] along the Israeli-Egyptian border, mainly due to the
presence of a United Nation's peacekeeping force. The remainder of the
Middle East, however, had not achieved such stability. The Syrian-Israeli
border in particular became the scene of bitter fighting between Arabs
and Jews. Guerilla raids by the dozens were conducted during the 1965-
1967 time frame against Israel. Many of these Arab raids were in
response to Israeli actions in three demilitarized zones along the border.
These constant tensions were a hindrance to all attempts aimed at
achieving stability in the region. [Ref. 15:p. 2231
A crucial disagreement arose in 1964 as a coalition of Arab nations
agreed to a plan aimed at diverting the headwaters of the river Jordan,
knowing full well the devastating effect this would have on Israeli agricul-
tural efforts. In November of that year [Ref. 12:p. 147], Israeli aircraft
were sent into action against those diversion work sites which were out-
side of IDF artillery range. Israel's strong actions forced a cessation of the
ill-fated diversion plan.
A more ominous development occurred in this time frame when the
Arab League agreed to the establishment of a "Palestinian entity" and
provided this group with materiel and moral support to intensify guerilla
activity along Israel's borders. Attempts by Israel throughout the middle
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1960s to gain support [Ref. 15:pp. 224-225) from the United Nations
were met with little success. The United Nations was seen as weak and
ineffectual by both sides and was generally ignored when it did attempt
to act as an intermediary. In many respects, the tensions and situation
which gave rise to the 1956 war were duplicated in the days leading up
to the Six-Day War.
The final impetus towards war occurred on May 22, 1967, when
Egypt's President Nasser [Ref. 11:p. 1331 ordered that the Strait of Tiran
be blockaded to Israeli shipping. This was a declared Israeli causus bel/i
and the IDF began plans for a preemptive strike.
B. ENEMY FORCES
Quantitatively, the balance of forces prior to the outbreak of hostili-
ties favored the Arab nations. Indeed, in Egypt, President Nasser in the
days leading to the war deployed some 100,000 troops in seven divisions
along his border with Israel. With these soldiers [Ref. 12 :p. 1491 came
upwards of 1,000 tanks. As Nasser inspired much of the Arab world
toward a perceived final confrontation with Israel, additional League
nations agreed to support an attack. Before long, Israel was literally
ringed with enemy forces totalling 250,000 soldiers, 2,000 tanks and 700
modem aircraft. [Ref. 12:p. 1491
C. FRIENDLY FORCES
One of the most difficult, and frustrating, aspects of analyzing the
IDF lies in the fact that it has never published an order of battle for any
of its combat actions. Indeed, much of the mystique which surrounds
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this force can be attributed to this issue. Nobody, outside of a select few
high-level Israeli leaders, is sure how large the Israeli forces were which
fought the Arabs in 1967. Although outnumbered in terms of weapons
systems, an estimate [Ref. 15:p. 2311 of the total troop strength of the
IDF on 4 June 1967 was 250,000, roughly equal to its Arab counter-
parts. Consensus of several sources would place the number of brigades
under 25. Of these, approximately eight were armored brigades, with ten
to twelve standard infantry and the remainder elite parachute brigades.
The air force portion of the IDF consisted of approximately 200 fighter
aircraft. [Ref. 13 :p. 391
D. OPERATIONS
The Israeli victory over the Arabs in the six days beginning on
June 5, 1967 was accomplished by professionals who understood the
need to seize the initiative across the battlefield. Complete volumes have
been written detailing the scope of the Israeli victory. Here, only a capsu-
lized version will be offered.
. The Air War
The major function of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) had long been to
deliver a preemptive strike against the enemy. On the morning of June 5
it did just this. From a mission start time of 0710 until completion late
that afternoon, the IAF destroyed [Ref. 11:p. 137] 286 Egyptian planes,
52 Syrian, 27 Jordanian, and nine Iraqi. All this was at a cost of only 19
Israeli planes. The means by which this was accomplished were multiple.
First, the IAF made use of the element of surprise by attacking Egyptian
bases at a time coinciding with the breakfast hour. In fact, the attack
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found most [Ref. 12:p. 1521 of the Egyptian Air Force Command person-
nel in their cars en route from their homes. Second, the IAF flew at
extremely low altitudes to avoid radar detection and increase bombing hit
probabilities. Finally, even though the IAF had fewer than 200 planes
with which to strike, it committed almost its entire force to the undertak-
ing, a considerable risk which paid huge dividends. [Ref. 1 1:p. 1371
2. The War Against Egypt
The Israeli General Staff recognized Egypt as the principal and
most dangerous enemy. Plans were devised to concentrate the bulk of
IDF ground power against Egypt while attempting to avoid fighting on the
other fronts for as long as possible. [Ref. 1 l:p. 1371
The Southern Command of the IDF consisted of a three-
division-sized force. In the north was General Israel Tal's two-armored-
brigade task force, in the center General Yoffe, also with two brigades of
armor, and in the south, General Sharon with a mixed division of armor
and infantry brigades. The average strength of these divisions was
approximately 15,000 soldiers. [Ref. 15:pp. 243-244]
The overall operational concept of the southern land war can be
summed in four points and is graphically depicted in Figure 5 (Ref. 3:p.
200). First was a breakthrough of the Egyptian lines in two sectors, along
the coastal axis and at Abu Ageila-Um Katef in the south. Second. a deep
penetration by General Yoffe aimed at smashing an anticipated second
Egyptian defensive line. Third, a concentration of the armor units of all
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Gifgafa. The final thrust would be an advance to the Suez Canal and
capture of Sharm el Sheikh. [Ref. 15:p. 2431
Each of the Israeli generals in the Sinai accomplished his
assigned mission, but in a very distinct manner. While Tal relied upon
the firepower and mobility of his armored forces, Sharon fought a care-
fully orchestrated set piece battle. Yaffe's division [Ref. 11:p. 1421 tra-
versed seemingly impassable terrain to establish blocking positions deep
in the Egyptians' rear. True to their heritage, the leaders of the IDF had
been given specific mission orders with wide latitude on how best to
accomplish them.
3. The War with Jordan
Israel desperately wanted to avoid a war with Jordan. King
Hussein of Jordan was, however, entangled in the web of Arab alliances
and was compelled to attack on June 5. The Israeli General Headquarters
was forced to improvise a swift and decisive response. [Ref. 11 :p. 1441
While the Jordanians could deploy seven infantry and two tank
brigades, the IDF was limited to its Central Command of a few units.
Using their interior lines of communication,however, GHQ was able to
divert a reserve brigade and units from the northern front to launch an
attack. In short order, the IDF would deploy two armored, one mecha-
nized, and eight infantry brigades against the Jordanians in a hastily
improvised operation which dramatically displayed its tactical flexibility.
[Ref. 9:p. 1381
In a matter of three days' fighting, the IDF had virtually
destroyed the Jordanian army and captured the West Bank of the Jordan
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River. With this conquest came the city of Jerusalem, the holiest place in
the Jewish religion.
4. The War Against Syria
Syria had not supported Nasser on June 5 with the establish-
ment of a second front. Instead, it had maintained a primarily defensive
orientation along the Golan Heights. While their Arab allies were being
soundly defeated on 7 and 8 June, the Syrians were content to limit
themselves to sporadic shelling-of nearby Jewish settlements. [Ref. 1 1:p.
147]
Once the war against Jordan was finished, the IDF turned its
attention to Syria and the Golan Heights. General Eleazar, Northern
Commander, chose a frontal attack at several points aimed at masking
his main thrust and preventing Syrian concentration against any one
point. For his main thrust, he chose the northern approach, the most
difficult terrain. In so doing, he attacked along the line of least expecta-
tion and fighting was concluded in 27 hours with the IDF within striking
distance of Damascus [Ref. 1 1:p. 147]. This operation is depicted in Fig-
ure 6 [Ref. 1l:p. 149].
E. RESULTS
The aftermath of the Six-Day War fundamentally altered Israel's
strategic situation. For the first time in its history, it had the benefit of
defense in depth. From the south, it had the Sinai Desert to act as a
buffer. Control of the West Bank had expanded the narrow center of
Israel and pushed back potentially hostile forces. In the north, the Golan
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Heights now offered the IDF the luxury of artillery and armor dominance
over Damascus, in complete reversal of the pre-war situation. Indeed,
Israel could now bargain for peace from a position of strength in the
region. [Ref. 12:p. 1891
F. ANALYSIS
1. Inputs to the System
The IDF which accomplished the incredible feats of the Six-Day
War was a fundamentally different organization than the one which cap-
tured the Sinai in 1956. The period between the wars had seen a funda-
mental evaluation of the structure of the IDF. Both civilian and military
leadership had used the interim period to define the future role of the
IDF based upon perceived or real changes in technology, the nature of
the threat, socio-economic factors in Israeli society, and defense doctrine.
a. Technology
During the period leading to the Six-Day War, both the
Arabs and Israelis embarked upon programs designed to exploit the
increased technological capabilities of weapons systems. While the Arabs
were supported in their efforts by the Soviets, the IDF was forced to mod-
ernize its existing stocks, attempt to purchase modern systems from
abroad, and develop its fledgling domestic arms industry.
The IAF was in the process of purchasing modem fighter
bombers from the U.S. and France when the war broke out. The U.S.
fighters were delivered after the war, while changes in French foreign
policy caused cancellation of arms sales to Israel. [Ref. 13:p. 391
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While the Egyptians were willing to accept any Soviet wea-
pon they could get, the Israelis were extremely selective in absorbing
increasingly advanced weapons. They purchased weapons selectively
after conducting extensive testing to insure adequate performance to suit
local conditions and Israeli tactics. Im,:orted tanks were rebuilt for desert
warfare and aircraft were modified according to Israeli specifications. The
Israelis never permitted themselves to be overwhelmed by new
technologies. [Ref. 8:p. 1711
b. The Threat
The Arabs not only had accepted large quantities of Soviet
weapons but also had adopted Soviet doctrine and tactics. The Egyptian
army in the early 1960s had deployed in the Sinai in accordance with
Soviet techniques. It was deployed in several fortified lines flanked by
natural obstacles. Located to the rear of these lines were large concentra-
tions of armor. This was a clear example of the Soviet "sword and shield"
doctrine, the lines being the shield and the massed armor the sword.
These defensive perimeters were established along major axes of advance
into the Sinai, insuring they could not be bypassed by the rapid tactics of
the IDF [Ref. 1 1:p. 1231. In addition, the Egyptians had adopted the
Soviet anti-tank tactic of massing their guns and training their crews to
fire in salvoes against one tank at a time [Ref. 8:p. 1881.
c. Socio-Economic Factors
The rapid growth of Israeli society provided the means by
which the IDF was restructured. Although the population c. israel tripled
during the period 1948-1967, the gross national product was growing at
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a rate of more than ten percent. In short order, citizens went from living
in tents and wooden huts to modern housing. Whereas rationing had
been the norm in the early days of Israeli society, goods were now in
relative abundance. These economic developments allowed the nation to
absorb a steadily increasing defense budget and bring about upgrades in
the defense forces. [Ref. 8 :p. 170]
d. Changing Doctrine
The fundamental lesson the Israelis learned from the 1956
Sinai campaign was that mobile warfare was the doctrine which best fit
their defense needs. More than ever, the Israelis were convinced of the
need for a short war capability- that their survival depended on quick
and decisive victories [Ref. 4:p. 14.. This, coupled with their offensive ori-
entation, dictated the structure of the IDF [Ref. 8: p. 1721. This national
military doctrine drove a great many of the force changes in the years
leading to the Six-Day War but, in the view of one author, "the most
important development in the ground forces was the expansion of the
Armored Corps and its transformation into the decisive arm." [Ref. 1 1:p.
1211 Equally important, in the author's opinion, was the increased role of
the Israeli Air Force as a means of accomplishing an effective first strike.
In a nation with limited resources such as Israel, a decision
to make the armor branch the decisive arm can have far-reaching conse-
quences. The military leaders of the Armor Corps during this period
believed that armor alone could win a decision on the battlefield and that
infantry could be relegated to support actions. This feeling led to deci-
sions to allocate resources to upgrading the armor branch with new
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equipment, while the infantry was to maintain the aging fleet of M3 half-
tracks. During the Six-Day War, this predominance of armor was vali-
dated, but only because of the lack of sophisticated anti-tank weapons in
the hands of Arab infantry.
Air superiority was a key tenet in the defense doctrine of
Israel. It was clearly dominant in that,
during the sixties the Air Force continued to enjoy a clear priority in
the allocation of money and manpower; it had the pick of the coun-
try's youth in its all volunteer force and received a major share of the
hard currency in the procurement budget. [Ref. 8:p. 192]
The IAF had convinced the leadership, in the author's opinion, that while
ground forces could fight and win in less than the most modem equip-
ment, the air force must have the capacity to fight an enemy from an
equal footing.
2. Organizational Structure
The result of the interim period of 1956-967 was an IDF that
had been fundamentally restructured based upon the aforementioned
inputs to the organizational system. While the changes were dramatic, it
Is important to note that they were gradual in nature and evolved over
the decade. The IDF, by its very nature, can never "stand down." Organi-
zational changes must be accomplished in the context of constant mili-
tary preparedness.
a. Strategic Apex
The General Headquarters (GHQ) of the IDF during the Six-
Day War was a much more viable entity than it had been only a decade
earlier. The affirmation of the short-war doctrine led to the need for a
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GHQ capable of providing command and control over each of the areas of
operation. The GHQ had become an integrated and centralized structure
without separate staffs for the air force, navy, or army. The Chief of Staff
is the Supreme Commander and, in time of war, the chiefs of the air force
and navy serve as his advisors. [Ref. 9:p. 1231
Nowhere was the importance of the GHQ more evident than
in the war against Jordan. Having properly identified Egypt as the pri-
mary threat, few forces were allcated to the Central Command. In fact,
intense efforts were made to avert a war with King Hussein. Once the war
became inevitable, however, GHQ maneuvered adequate forces from
Northern Command and from reserve brigades to defeat the Jordanians
in short order. [Ref. 11:p. 143]
Also at the strategic apex of the IDF were men who had
experienced the two previous wars, Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin.
Dayan was installed as Minister of Defense just days prior to the out-
break of the war. He brought to his new post, and the IDF, charisma and
daring leadership at a crucial time. Likewise, Rabin, a veteran Palmach
officer, had overseen the changes [Ref. 8:p. 2021 in the IDF as Chief of
Staff and was intimately familiar with its strengths and weaknesses.
b. The Middle Line
The role of the officer in the IDF had been validated during
the War of Independence and the Sinai Campaign. In the years leading to
the Six-Day War it was formalized. Dayan insisted upon his vision of the
heroic combat leader who always leads his soldiers from the front. While
this philosophy results in extremely high officer casualty rates (23
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percent of IDF casualties in the 1967 war were either officers or NCOs), it
also remains one of the main secrets of Israel's success. [Ref. 12:p. 190]
Policies were put into place in the IDF to insure that a tal-
ented supply of officers would be available to lead. Officers are selected
from among the newest recruits based upon leadership attributes and
military proficiency. Upon selection, they are aggressively schooled and
trained for their role as combat leaders. In order to receive exposure to all
facets of the IDF, officers are rotated from staff to command assignments
throughout their careers. As Chief of Staff, Rabin Instituted a program to
train officers in modem management and planning methods, resulting in
a more professional officer corps. [Ref. 8:p. 1811
Although not a formal regulation, Dayan instituted a policy
calling for officers to retire from active duty by the age of 40. He felt that
this policy had the dual benefit of allowing junior officers to move up the
ranks quickly while providing the nation's economy with a source of
talented leaders young enough to pursue a second career. [Ref. 8:p. 1801
c. The Operating Core
While other aspects of the IDF were undergoing a funda-
mental restructuring, the operating core of the organization retained its
basic character- an army which "...came from the people and returns to
the people." [Ref. 11 :p. 1151 While the nature of the IDF at its most basic
level (a large reserve force with an active duty contingent of conscripts
and a small nucleus of career soldiers) did not change, the quality of the
manpower pool increased greatly. Conscripts were in better physical
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shape, better educated, and better trained because their instructors were
products of the post-1956 Army. [Ref. 8:p. 180]
One clear change at the operating core level was in the role
of women in the IDF. No longer assigned to combat units, women were
nonetheless utilized In key administrative and logistical functions. The
females of the IDF were assigned in groups no smaller than 15. Disci-
pline of female soldiers was to be handled only by female superiors. In
addition, in an effort to maintain discipline, female soldiers were
assigned to units close to their homes whenever possible so that they did
not spend the night in IDF barracks. [Ref. 1 1:p. 117]
d. The Support Structure
The supporting structure of the IDF underwent a radical
restructuring in response to doctrine and the nature of the modem bat-
tlefield. In order to meet the needs of the mobile warfare doctrine they
had established, the IDF adopted from the U.S. Army the concept of the
"push system," which moved supplies forward without waiting for specific
requ Itions. It was understood that as mechanized units maneuver on
the battlefield, supply lines must follow. The push system of support is a
concept where fuel, ammunition, and other supplies are sent up the
main axis of advance without waiting for a specific unit's request. Under
this system in the IDF, area supply depots would send forward supplies
to division support elements. At division, the supplies would be broken
down into smaller convoys and pushed to brigades, and so on until the
supplies would reach the actual combat units [Ref. 8:p. 174]. This
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system allowed tactical commanders the freedom to maneuver without
the constant fear of exhausting critical supplies.
Chief of Staff Rabin proved to be particularly innovative in
the area of support. Under his guidance, the IDF upgraded the capability
of support services such as ordnance and logistics. Additionally, he intro-
duced modem management techniques and computers to streamline
administrative requirements. [Ref. 8:p. 1771
e. The Technostructure
The GHQ had experimented in the 1956 war with an ugdah
or divisional system. Prior to the 1967 war, this system was fully imple-
mented in the IDF. The ugdah concept [Ref. 8:p. 1761 could cater to any
combination of armor, infantry, artillery, or service units, as opposed to
the more rigid structure of a conventional division. In the ugdah, units
were allocated to the divisional structure with self-contained supporting
units, allowing for more rapid and flexible force organization. These divi-
sions were, in 1967, really task forces and were in no way standardized.
Their strength lay in the flexibility they allowed the commanders to shift
reserve forces -intemally" to whichever division was most in need. [Ref.
18:p. 201]
f . Ideology
By 1967, a new generation of citizen-soldiers had taken the
place of the veterans of the War of Independence and the Sinai Cam-
paign. There existed some apprehension about the willingness of this
group to fight and, if necessary, die for the preservation of the State of
Israel. These doubts proved unfounded, however, as the new IDF fighter
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understood there could be no retreat or surrender as the enemy was bent
on destroying his home, his family, and his nation. Limited alternatives,
Israelis have shown time and again, make for formidable fighters. [Ref.
11:p. 1161
An interesting aspect of the Jewish character is a
"...curious ambivalence towards the enemy." [Ref. 11:p. 1161 Although
made up of fierce fighters, the IDF has never adopted an objective of
inflicting maximum casualties on the enemy. Indeed, measures are taken
to insure that prisoners of war are treated with dignity and compassion.
Standing orders were in place warning soldiers not to shoot at surrender-
ing or fleeing enemies and to protect civilians and their property. Inci-
dents violating this informal code of conduct are treated with the
harshest of discipline. [Ref. 1 1:p. 1161
3. Organizational Outputs
The result of the restructuring of the IDF during the period
between the Sinai campaign and the Six-Day War was a force capable of
mobile, offensive warfare.
a. Unity of Command
The concept of optional control, merely a theory in 1956.
was fully validated during the Six-Day War. This command and control
(C2) technique insures that "...middle-rank officers in charge of battal-
ions and brigades are given full powers to make tactical decisions in the
course of the battle...," while still allowing senior commanders the option
to intervene when necessary. [Ref. 8:pp. 173-1741
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This C2 doctrine places a tremendous reliance on the skills
and initiatives of the IDF's leadership. It demands more than anything
else accurate reporting. This system cannot work with officers who "...try
to conceal their failures or exaggerate enemy strengths ...." [Ref. 8:p. 1731
If reporting is inaccurate, a vicious circle develops. Having supplied false
information to a superior, an officer may not trust orders received from
above because he knows that those orders are based upon inaccurate
reports.
Given accurate reporting, however, the IDF believed that
optional control can act as a force multiplier on the battlefield. It allows
an army to respond in real time to tactical opportunities which present
themselves on the battlefield. Israeli officers are taught that the "fog of
war" can be used to advantage [Ref. 8:p. 1731. When plans break down
and the enemy responds in an unexpected manner, IDF leaders are
taught to continue fighting and moving toward their objectives. They are
instructed to "...impose their will on the confusion of battle and deter-
mine its outcome." [Ref. 8:p. 174] Optional control, coupled with the
principle of maintenance of the objective, allows for total flexibility,
except for the choice of the objective. In that respect, leaders are able to
work backwards in their planning, making decisions based on their
units' strengths and weaknesses, as long as the objective is attained.
[Ref. 8:p. 1741
b. Surprise
The initial air strike by the IAF, in a carefully planned
attack, took the Egyptian and other Arab air forces by surprise and
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paved the way for victory by the ground forces [Ref. 12 :p. 188]. The ele-
ment of surprise seriously disrupted the Egyptian and Jordanian com-
mand, allowing IDF ground forces to exploit their superior combat effec-
tiveness [Ref. 15:p. 3351 without having to cope with the enemy's air
power. The IDF may not have fully recognized, however, the devastating
physical and psychological effects of the air strikes on the Arab ground
forces, and may have overestimated their combat effectiveness as a
result. [Ref. 15:p. 346] -
The IDF, by conducting the massive preemptive air attack,
was taking a risk. In essence, the leadership was leaving Israel unpro-
tected from enemy air attacks in order to undertake this mission. This
was a measured risk that had been carefully weighed by the Israeli
leadership.
c. Offensive
The IDF strategy of taking the battle to enemy territory and
seizing the offensive was fully validated during the Six-Day War. Like-
wise, the importance of the first strike was reinforced.
d. Maneuver
While the nature of the war resulted in little uniformity in
the tactics used, the predominance of armor and the IAF were affirmed.
Only in the Syrian conflict did infantry fight independently, further serv-
ing to diminish its role in the IDF. The IDF used the mobility of its
armored forces in concert with its flexible command structures to gain
local superiority at the decisive point. Excellent tank gunnery allowed
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massed armored formations to role through open desert, unhampered by
enemy anti-tank positions. [Ref. 1 l:p. 1511
The leaders of the Armor Corps felt [Ref. 8:p. 1921 that the
lessons of the 1967 war proved that well-trained armored forces do not
need mechanized infantry forces accompanying them into battle but only
to mop up after them. This interpretation would prove costly in the open-
ing days of the Yom Kippur war, however.
4. Summary
It is somewhat difficult to make broad assessments of the IDF's
combat actions in 1967. In many respects, this was three wars fought
against three very different enemies. Nevertheless, the Six-Day War was a
proven, undeniable victory for the IDF and an affirmation of the struc-
turai changes which had occurred since 1956. While the lessons they
learned from this war were valid for the most part, some in the Israeli
Command credited themselves [Ref. 12:p. 189] with achievements that
were more a result of Arab incompetence than Israeli effectiveness. Par-
ticularly in the area of air and armor dominance, the IDF would learn
that all combat forces have their limitations.
G. THE ENVIRONMENT
In the author's opinion, the IDF was operating in a complex and
dynamic environment in 1967. The variety which existed among the mul-
tiple threats, changing weapons technology, and socio-economic factors
affected this assessment.
While the General Headquarters had fully evolved as a viable com-
mand organization by this time, there was an organizational trend
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toward decentralization. This occurs simply because any single man or
headquarters cannot handle the multitude of information which is inher-
ent in a complex and dynamic environment [Ref. 7:p. 295]. Flexibility was
attained through utilizing the ugdah system and tailoring various units
to meet the needs of a rapidly changing situation. Although each ugdah
was not standardized, the process of task organization had been.
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VI. THE YOM KIPPUR WAR




The Yom Kippur War, launched as a coordinated attack by an Arab
coalition, caught the IDF by surprise. Overconfidence on the part of
Israeli civilian and military leadership resulted in a false sense of security
concerning Arab intentions. In many respects, the origins of the Yom
Kippur War can be traced back to the conclusion of the 1967 Six-Day
War. While the Arab leadership did not forget the lessons of that
resounding defeat, they did embark upon a long-term strategy aimed at
regaining the lost territories. President Sadat of Egypt, in particular,
knew that the solution would have to be a combination of political as well
as military moves. He also recognized that any military action he took
would have to be massive in order to counter the IDF's tendency to retali-
ate with massive force against even the most minor operations. [Ref.
12:p. 2271
In part, the IDF was caught unprepared due to the prolonged War of
Attrition which took place almost immediately upon the conclusion of the
Six-Day War and lasted until August 1970, when an American-sponsored
cease-fire [Ref. 9:p. 178] went into effect. The stated aim of the Arabs
during this war was to wear Israel down by hammering away at her
defenses and inflicting unacceptable casualties.
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The War of Attrition caused the IDF to fight with a defensive orien-
tation, from static lines. Since plans and operations had always been
directed towards an offensive mode, this was a radical departure from its
normal doctrine. There was a great concern on the part of many in Israel
that fighting on the defensive would stymie the initiative and aggressive-
ness of its soldiers. [Ref. 9:p. 1801
Repeated exercises by the Egyptians on their side of the Suez Canal
had made the IDFs intelligence community complacent. While there were
massive amounts of information available indicating that an Arab attack
was imminent, the intelligence branch [Ref. 15:p. 408] dismissed it out of
hand. When the attack was launched at 1400 on 6 October 1973, the
IDF was woefully unprepared. This would nearly cost them everything.
B. ENEMY FORCES
The reason many in Israel discounted the likelihood of an Arab
attack was the perception that the LAF was simply too dominant in the
region. The conventional wisdom was that until the Arabs had the capa-
bility to neutralize the Air force of Israel, they would not attempt an
attack. The Arabs recognized that
[Tihe solution was to create an anti-aircraft umbrella by dense
massing and mixing of numerous systems which would provide
redundant coverage and negate the effectiveness of Israeli electronic
countermeasures against any single system. [Ref. 13:p. 61]
The Soviets provided Egypt and Syria with such a system, consisting of
SAM-2, SAM-3, and SAM-6 as well as conventional air defense weapons.
In addition, the Soviets provided SCUD surface-to-surface missiles,
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which would threaten cities in Israel in the event of deep penetrations by
IAF fighter bombers into Egypt or Syria. [Ref. 12 :p. 2271
The Arabs also learned lessons from 1967 and agreed to launch
attacks simultaneously in order to stretch the IDF to its limits. Both
Syria and Egypt agreed to attack along broad fronts in an attempt to
spread the IDF to its breaking point.
The strength of the Egyptian army just prior to the war included
approximately 300,000 soldiers, 1,600 tanks, 1,850 artillery pieces, and
62 SAM batteries. The Syrians had 190,000 soldiers, 1,500 tanks, 600
artillery pieces, and 38 SAM batteries. [Ref. 13:p. 62]
C. FRIENDLY FORCE
During one of the periodic lulls in the War of Attrition, the IDF con-
structed a series of concrete fortifications along the Suez Canal. These
positions were not originally intended to be heavily defended fighting
positions but rather a series of lookouts. Soon, however, var;uus factions
of the IDF insisted on increasing the fighting abilities of this so-called
Bar-Lev line and firing ramps for tanks were constructed. What resulted,
in the author's opinion, was a combination of both concepts- observation
posts with limited fighting capabilities.
The interval from 1967 to 1973 had seen the transformation of the
IDF from an organization heavily dependent on manpower to one heavy
in hardware. Massive American arms and equipment [Ref. 18:p. 2031 had
been absorbed by the Israelis. The IDF when fully mobilized could field
over 300,000 soldiers, 2,000 tanks, and 900 guns and heavy mortars. In
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terms of units, this equated to 17 brigades of armor, three airborne
brigades, and a few regular infantry brigades. [Ref. 13:p. 621
D. OPERATIONS
The three-week Yom Kippur War can be divided into four major
phases: the holding phase of 6-7 October, the counter-attacks of 8-10
October, attacks against Syria with a repulse of the Egyptian attack 11-
14 October, and IDF offensive 15-25 October. [Ref. 1 l:p. 1851
1. The Holding Phase: 6-7 October
The Egyptians attacked across the Suez Canal using estab-
lished Soviet doctrine. Forward elements of five divisions crossed in rub-
ber boats. While some engaged positions along the Bar-Lev line, others
penetrated deep to establish anti-tank positions to screen the crossing of
the main body. The lightly held IDF positions proved to be no match in
stopping the massive Egyptian crossing, although they did manage to
delay the onslaught. The IDF active armored division in the Sinai fought
a series of disjointed actions in attempting to relieve the Bar-Lev strong
points and regain control of the canal. Their efforts did little but result in
the near decimation of the division. [Ref. 1 l:p. 1861
The war in the north against Syria went much better for the
IDF. Syria attacked along three major axes: one in the north, two in the
south. The armored brigades of the IDF fought well against the quantita-
tively superior force. Much of the attacking force was destroyed from pre-
pared positions using excellent tank gunnery skills. Superior Syrian
numbers began to overwhelm the southern flank of the Golan defenses
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and the IAF was diverted to slow them down until IDF reserve brigades
could be mustered and employed. [Ref. 1 1:p. 188]
2. Counter-Attacks: 8-10 October
The IDFs predisposition to always seek the offensive was evi-
dent on the southern front on 8 October. General Gonen, commander of
the Southern Front, attempted to launch a massive counter-attack. The
concept was for one division to penetrate the Egyptian lines all the way to
the canal and then roll up the exposed enemy flanks by wheeling south.
The attack failed miserably as the armor moved without infantry support
into a mass of concentrated Egyptian anti-tank weapons. The disastrous
operation resulted in General Gonen being replaced by General Bar-Lev.
(Ref. l1:p. 1901
The war in the north continued to go much better for the IDF.
Fresh divisions were launched against the southern and central sectors
of the Syrian army, and while their resistance was determined, the IDF
drove them back. The TAF had mastered the use of electronic counter-
measures to diminish the effectiveness of the SAM batteries and allow
them to help influence the outcome of the ground battle. In an effort to
send a message to the Jordanians not to enter the war, as well as meet
head-on three advancing Iraqi divisions, the decision was made to con-
tinue the attack into Syria.
3. Northern Offensive and Repulse the Egyptians: 11-14 Oct
The commander of the Northern Front, General Hofi, decided to
attack from his northernmost sector. This, he felt, would offer the dual
advantage of protecting his flank with Mount Hermon while forcing the
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Syrians onto the defensive. An additional attack was planned along the
Kunettra-Damrascus axis, with the final division used as a screening force
on the flanks against a suspected Jordanian, Saudi, and Iraqi counter-
attack. By the morning of the 12th, both attacks had penetrated Syrian
defenses, inflicting heavy casualties on the Arab coalition. In all, the
Syrians lost 1,150 tanks, the Iraqis about 100, and the Jordanians 50.
The IDF in this sector lost about 100 tanks, but many more were
damaged. The role of the IAF in forging this victory cannot be under-
estimated. (Ref. 11 :p. 1931
In an effort to save the Syrian forces from total defeat, the Egyp-
tians began moving their armor reserves across the Suez Canal in prepa-
ration for a major offensive. By now, however, the reserves of the IDF had
formed in the Sinai and consisted of more than 700 tanks. In the biggest
tank battle since WW II, the Egyptians lost almost half of their armored
forces in one day. IDF losses stood at six. The Egyptians had advanced
beyond the protection of their air-defense umbrella, making them vulner-
able to IAF attacks. This, coupled with superior IDF gunnery skill and
American TOW missiles, had resulted in the Egyptian debacle. [Ref.
21:p. 181
4. IDF Counter-Offensive: 15-25 October
In order to bring the war to a close on its terms, the IDF con-
ducted Operation Gazelle (an offensive across the Suez Canal). This oper-
ation is depicted in Figure 7 [Ref. I1 :p. 1961. This was felt to be the only
way to dislodge the Egyptians from their heavily defended positions on
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the east side of the canal while utilizing the IDF's mastery of mobile
warfare.
The actual crossing operation was conducted by the division of
General Sharon. Using rubber rafts and ferries, he was able to transfer
some of his division across in full view of the surprised and disoriented
Egyptians. After the IDF engineers had established two bridges, elements
of three divisions poured across, effectively cutting off Egypt's Third
Army. A hasty cease-fire was imposed by the United Nations with the IDF
poised on the road to Cairo. (Ref. 21:p. 201
E. RESULTS
In retrospect, while Israel won the war on the battlefield, in the
author's opinion, it lost it politically. The United Nations Security Council
had called for a cease-fire when Egypt's Third Army was about to be
destroyed. As a result of the negotiated troop disengagements, the
Israelis were forced to give up the territory they had captured on the west
side of the canal. In addition, they had to withdraw off of the banks of the
Suez in the east.
Most ominous was the crisis of confidence this war caused internally
in Israel. The civilian leadership, particularly Defense Minister Moshe
Dayan, was heavily criticized [Ref. 9:p. 2201 for allowing a lack of pre-
paredness and for their handling of the war. Also in the aftermath came
the "War of the Generals," an ugly exchange between the IDF's top
leadership assessing fatilt for problems in the conduct of the war. Even
though it had won on the battlefield, the Israelis did not look or act like
winners in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War.
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F. ANALYSIS
1. Inputs to the System
In the words of one noted author on the growth and change in
the IDF from the end of the Six-Day War to the start of the Yom Kippur
War, "[Seldom has a victorious army undergone such a radical transfor-
mation so soon after its men and methods had proved so successful in
battle." [Ref. 8:p. 3361 The changes which occurred in the IDF during this
period were brought about, once again, by a complex array of factors.
Included among these were the nature of the threat faced during and
after the years of the War of Attrition, a booming national economy,
increasingly complex weaponry, and changes in doctrine brought about
by necessity as well as by choice. It will be shown in this analysis that, in
some cases, an unwillingness to impose organizational changes resulted
in poor performance on the battlefield in the initial days of the Yom
Kippur War.
a. Socio-Economic Factors
The growth of the Israeli economy during the years preced-
ing the Yom Kippur War was incredible. For example, the number of pri-
vate automobiles in Israel doubled between 1967 and 1971 [Ref. 8:p.
327]. During this time, the nation was running a full-employment econ-
omy. The War of Attrition was placing tremendous demands on the econ-
omy because the need for money and manpower to maintain the defen-
sive posture was acute. The defense budget of Israel during these years
[Ref. 8:p. 3281 amounted to more than a quarter of the gross national
product (GNP). The values of a consumer society adversely affected the
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IDF. Reports of lower performance standards, faulty equipment mainte-
nance, and loose inventory control were pervasive. [Ref. 1 1:p. 156]
During this period, there arose a small group of middle-
class intellectuals in Israel who challenged the levels of military spending
as well as the morality of holding onto the captured territories. Though
their impact remained small, they served to undermine unity in national
security efforts. [Ref. 1 1:p. 1561
The security demands of the nation were in conflict with
the demands of the economy. Substantial resources were absorbed in
allocating human and material assets in support of a broad range of
security programs.
b. The Threat
While Israel's victory in the Six-Day War significantly
improved its geostrategic position, it also vastly increased the borders it
was called upon to defend. While Israel has always relied upon a small
standing force, supplemented by a huge reserve, the Arab nations have
maintained some of the largest standing armies in the world. This fact,
coupled with massive Soviet arms transfusions, dramatically increased
the scope of the threat faced by the IDF.
Also, the captured territories greatly increased the role of
the Israeli Navy. Whereas before 1967, the navy provided mainly coastal
defense, the capture of the Sinai greatly increased the Israeli border, and
thus the threat, on the sea. [Ref. 1 1:p. 164]
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c. Weapons Technology
One of the major deterrents to an Egyptian attack across
the Suez Canal had been the vivid memories of the air superiority
achieved by the IAF in 1967. Thus, the introduction of the latest Soviet
surface-to-air missiles (SAM) into the region fundamentally altered the
security equation.
Advances in anti-tank weapons would also prove signifi-
cant, although IDF doctrine did not respond prior to the 1973 war. Man-
packed and reliable, these weapons would alter the IDF preference
toward the "all-armor" assaults it had adopted as a result of successes in
the Six-Day War.
d. Doctrinal Changes
While the lessons of the Six-Day War appeared to vindicate
the proponents of the "all-armor" doctrine, this approach was not
accepted without disagreement. Some in the IDF leadership insisted on a
more balanced approach of combined arms operations. The net result,
however, was a force still heavily oriented towards armor with the
infantry relegated to a supporting role. The tank purists managed to dis-
count the threat posed by anti-tank guided missiles and rocket-propelled
grenades. It was their belief that in the desert, massive tank formations
could penetrate concentrated anti-tank weapons through speed and fire-
power. [Ref. 11:p. 1601
The result of the capture of all the territory of the Six-Day
War was a transformation of the IDF from a mobile force to one of territo-
rial defense. The manner of accomplishing this new mission was the
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subject of considerable debate among the leadership. The concept of the
Bar-Lev line in particular caused considerable controversy from a faction
in the IDF opposed to any sort of static orientation. In any case, while
manpower issues began to become more pressing as the nature of the
mission began to change, so too did the heavy reliance on the intelligence
services. All IDF doctrine was based on the understanding that there
would be at least a 48-hour warning prior to an Arab attack in which to
mobilize the reserves. [Ref. 9:pp. 212-2131
2. Organizational Structure
In the author's opinion, the willingness of the IDF to introspec-
tively evaluate its organization and the way it operates has been a consis-
tent quality. In some instances, however, the lessons of 1967 were either
misread or not read at all, resulting in limited or improper organizational
changes in the IDF. In addition, the IDF experienced what might be
called "growing pains" as the size and complexity of the organization
expanded.
a. Strategic Apex
While the GHQ had firmly established its role within the
IDF as the focal point of command and control activities, the method of
manning and operating this organization was in disrepair. Most of the
senior generals who had led the army through the previous wars had left
active service. Yet, while they were replaced by able leaders, they contin-
ued to remain around the periphery of daily operations of the IDF.
Indeed, many of the senior leaders had assumed political positions in the
government (e.g., Sharon, Rabin, Bar-Lev). As a result, much of the
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internal conflict which is inherent in any military organization attempting
to redefine its missions and roles was played out in a very public fashion.
The assumption of command by the "new" generation of
leaders resulted in some real operational difficulties. On the Southern
Front, for example, General Gonen was in command. One of his division
commanders was General Sharon, who only months before had been the
front commander. Naturally, the command relationship here was awk-
ward at best, impossible at worst. [Ref. 12:pp. 254-2551
At the GHQ, during the initial stages of the war when
things were not going well for the IDF, General Eleazer was visited by
three former chiefs of staff offering assistance. In the clamor and confu-
sion of the command post, such assistance was hardly welcome or pro-
ductive to the effort. [Ref. 18:p. 2091
b. Middle Line and Operating Core
Given the structural nature of the changes which occurred
after the 1967 war, the middle line and the operating core will be ana-
lyzed together. The analysis will be done in three parts: the ground
forces, the air forces, and the naval forces of the IDF.
(1) IDF Ground Forces. The fundamental challenge to the
IDF ground forces was to build a force oriented on the territorial defense
needs while maintaining constant combat readiness. By 1973, the IDF
could deploy seven armored divisions. Each of these divisions [Ref. 1 1:p.
1591 was configured with three armored brigades of two tank battalions
each, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery regiment, and small sup-
porting elements. While each armored division had an infantry battalion
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in each brigade, "half-tracks and APCs, serving both as personnel and
weapons carriers, were considered at best as secondary vehicles, and
often as superfluous impediments in an armored battle." [Ref. 1 l:p. 159]
The IDF discovered the value of artillery during the
Six-Day War and made efforts to upgrade its capabilities in this area. By
1973, IDF artillery was organized in regiments and entirely equipped with
self-propelled guns. [Ref. 1 1:p. 1611
(2) Air Forces. The performance of the IAF in the Six-Day
War had assured it a prominent place in the budget and defense deci-
sions of Israel. Indeed, many in Israel saw the IAF as an "all-purpose"
defense force. The most sophisticated aircraft available were purchased
from the United States. Addiwonally, the presence of Soviet SAM batteries
in Egypt and Syrian resulted in Israel receiving from the U.S. [Ref. 1 1:p.
163] the most advanced electronic counter-measure equipment available.
The personnel assigned to the IAF continued to be the cream of the crop
and underwent rigorous training.
(3) The Israeli Navy. The increased coastline of Israel
resulted in the expanded importance of the navy. Efforts were under-
taken, successfully, by Israel to purchase missile-capable boats in order
to gain some depth to their coastal defense. Additionally, the navy estab-
lished an elite force of commandos who had repeatedly distinguished
themselves. Personnel volunteering for the navy signed a career contract
and enlisted volunteers grew as the importance and stature of the service
was enhanced. The commander of the Israeli Navy in 1972 defined his
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services mission "...as defending Israel's coastline and sea communica-
tions by offensive action." [Ref. 1 1:p. 1651
c. Support Structure
Based upon the lack of support from her so-called allies in
1967, Israel made the conscious decision to become self-sufficient in as
many areas of weaponry as possible. While national industry was still
incapable of producing battle tanks and jet fighters, it did develop pro-
duction capabilities in light arms and all types of ammunition. Also,
long-term development programs were established for the future produc-
tion of sophisticated weaponry. [Ref. 8:p. 329]
d. Technostructure
The sheer size of the post-1967 IDF, coupled with the infu-
sion of massive amounts of American arms, resulted in organizational
change. After a great degree of argument, the decision was reached to
alter the ugdah (division). As opposed to the flexible approach adopted in
the Six-Day War, the division was standardized prior to 1973. The feeling
was that standardization of the division would result in a wider span of
control for a commander. In one analyst's opinion, however,
these changes, as well as the general neglect of the infantry, includ-
ing mechanized infantry, made subordinate units up to brigade less
self-contained and less able to deal with a variety of threats. [Ref.
18:p. 204]
e. Ideology
The level of tolerance for casualties in the IDF is very low.
Indeed, many operational decisions are made strictly on the basis of pos-
sible friendly losses. While this has a tremendous impact on the soldiers'
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morale (they know that their lives will not be risked frivolously), it can
also be used against the IDF by its enemies [Ref. 8:p. 206]. President
Nasser of Egypt once said, "...I cannot conquer Sinai, but I can grind
Israel down and break her spirit." [Ref. 9:p. 182] The memories of the
Nazi Holocaust make the Israelis extremely sensitive to any loss of life.
[Ref. 9:p. 1821
3. Organizational Outputs
Despite being surprised at the onset of the Yom Kippur War, the
IDF was able to recover in time to forge a victory on the battlefield. Its
performance in this war clearly showed evidence that its soldiers were
indeed human and capable of error, however. In the upcoming output
analysis, the author will show where the IDF failed to respond as an
organization to the aforementioned environmental inputs.
a. Security
The failure of the IDF intelligence community prior to the
Yom Kippur War was a classic one. It failed to focus on the enemy's
capabilities [Ref. 15:p. 585] and instead focused on what it perceived to
be his intentions. The failure of the intelligence community to give ade-
quate warning nearly cost Israel its very existence. The defense concept
of Israel had always been based upon the fact that warnings of hostile
intentions would be received in sufficient time to mobilize the reserves. In
effect, Israeli Intelligence failed to properly evaluate the material it had
collected. [Ref. 9:p. 2101
In some respects, Israeli leadership, both military and civil-
ian, had become anchored to the opinion or belief that the Arabs simply
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would not attack again. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrry,
the leadership chose to close its collective eyes, allowing the IDF to be
surprised on 6 October.
b. Unity of Command
The activities on the Southern Front in the opening days of
the Yom Kippur War were a case study in improper command and con-
trol. The previously alluded-to lack of personal trust among the senior
commanders resulted in a breakdown of the IDF optional control doc-
trine. Indeed, what resulted, in the opinion of one author [Ref. 18:p. 2281,
was reverse optional control. Distrust among the senior leadership,
starting with Chief of Staff Eleazar and extending through Front Com-
mander Gonen and down to division commanders such as Sharon,
resulted in each level reserving approval of important decisions for itself.
This in turn drove commanders to alter their plans and operations as
maintaining communications with higher headquarters became the over-
riding concern, taking priority over fighting the battle. The result of this
aberration was a total lack of initiative at the unit level, coupled with the
dysfunctional circumstance of the commander with the least information
[Ref. 18:p. 231] making the major decisions in a battle. Fortunately. this
problem was quickly rectified by the relief of General Gonen with General
Bar-Lev. Trust, re-introduced to the command, allowed for the implemen-




The most obvious lesson to come out of the Yom Kippur
War was the need for a more balanced approach to force structure in the
IDF. The combination of enemy infantrymen armed with anti-tank
weapons with the SAM batteries limiting the ability of the TAF to influ-
ence the ground battle called for a reappraisal of the "all-armor" doctrine.
Against modem tank defenses, this approach simply proved inadequate.
The massed firepower of the long-range anti-tank weapons simply could
no longer be overwhelmed by armored forces acting alone. Instead, it was
necessary for IDF infantry to move with the tanks, providing the capabil-
ity to rout out the anti-tank positions and allow the armored forces to
take full advantage of their speed and mobility. Additionally, the need for
adequate mortar and artillery support to assist in clearing the advance of
the armored forces of dug-in infantry with anti-tank weapons was never
more evident. [Ref. 13:p. 711
4. Summary
The lessons learned by the IDF in this war were certainly not all
bad. Indeed, more than ever, the qualitative edge of the IDF proved capa-
ble of beating quantitatively superior forces. This war identified to the
IDF leadership, however, some fundamental flaws in the organization of
the IDF [Ref. 9:p. 228], such as the lack of a strategic reserve and the
need to enlarge the standing portion of the force to counteract the Arabs.
The IDF leadership also identified the need to develop local weapons
industries to meet the demands of an increasingly complex battlefield.
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G. THE ENVIRONMENT
As an organization, the IDF believed that it was in a complex, yet
stable, environment in the period between 1967 and 1973. One senior
IDF leader even remarked after the 1967 victory that "the enemy is not
going to be able to fight for many years to come." [Ref. 1 1:p. 153]
In the author's opinion, the IDF misread the environment. This fail-
ure caused some improper organizational changes within the IDF,
including the more rigid and standardized ugdah. This attempt at stan-
dardization proved costly, particularly in the Southern Front, where
commanders appeared locked into predetermined plans and tactics with
little room or desire for flexibility. Additionally, the complexity of the envi-
ronment called for decentralization of command authority. Unfortunately,
the awkward command relationships which had developed, particularly
in the Southern Command, had made efficient decentralized command
impossible.
A second flaw in the IDF at the time was an organizational tendency
to simply ignore environmental variety. The intelligence branch in par-
ticular was anchored on one position and refused to believe obvious sig-
nals pointing to an Imminent attack.
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VII. LEBANON INVASION 1982
Of every tribe a thousand throughout all the tribes of Israel ye shall
send to the war.
Numbers 31:5
A. SITUATION
In order to understand the context of the operation the IDF under-
took in Lebanon in 1982, one must have a working knowledge of the
roots of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The creation of the
PLO in 1964 was prompted partly by Palestinian pressures on Arab
states to support their nationalist goals but mainly because of the nature
of the inter-Arab politics of the time and the self-interests of the states
involved [Ref. 22:p. 22). The PLO was designed to act as an umbrella
organization to provide some structure to the many anti-Israel guerilla
factions in existence at the time. The most powerful of these factions was
Al Fatah, led by Yasir Arafat. which would come to dominate the PLO
from both a military and political perspective. Fatah controls the PLO's
most important institutions and fills its diplomatic posts abroad [Ref.
22:p. 42]. The PLO does not, however, speak with one voice. The PLO is
not a national group but an international organization that maintains
connections with other guerilla movements throughout the world. It is an
extremely factionalized organization with approximately 20 groups repre-
senting various constituencies and advocating (and sometimes pursuing)
widely different political and military strategies. [Ref. 2 2 :p. 261
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The PLO gained prominence in the region at the conclusion of the
1967 war as a result of a respectable military performance and the wide-
spread belief that the organization was capable of inflicting damage upon
Israel [Ref. 4:pp. 31-321. After having suffered consecutive devastating
defeats at the hands of the IDF, the Arab states [Ref. 4:p. 32] looked at
the PLO as a convenient and inexpensive way to further their ultimate
goal of the destruction of Israel. This support of the PLO was in lieu of
direct military confrontation with the IDF and allowed the Arab states a
means to maneuver between the U.S. and the Soviets for influence in the
region as well as economic incentives. [Ref. 4:p. 321
The PLO has never been solely a military force. Instead, armed
struggle provided an immediate way to take action against Israel and
gain credibility for the organization among other Arabs. Military struggle
was thought less important than the act of resistance itself [Ref. 22:p.
861. Changes in strategy have refocused the PLO into concentrating its
attacks on Israel through political action on the world stage. First, the
PLO has attempted to portray itself as a legitimate freedom fighter move-
ment. Second, it has sought and received heavy financial support from
Arab states which, in addition to furthering the war against Israel,
sought to keep the Palestinians from causing unrest in their populations.
Third, the PLO has adopted a strategy of international terrorism aimed at
eroding support for Israel among western nations. A final tenet of the
PLO has been to maintain enough of a military force to inflict unaccept-
able casualties on Israel as well as continue to maintain leverage on the
Arab states, insuring their continuing financial support [Ref. 4:p. 331.
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Overall, the PLO has long been committed to thwarting the Arab-Israeli
peace process. They have reasoned that even another war that ends in
defeat for the Arabs is preferable to a negotiated settlement. They reason
that such a defeat might bring about the fall of moderate Arab regimes,
particularly King Hussein of Jordan, and create the necessary turmoil in
the region to achieve their organizational goals. [Ref. I1 :p. 1661
The seeds of the conflict with Lebanon were sown during the Jorda-
nian Civil War of 1970. The PL) had been fomenting internal unrest in
Jordan, resulting in military action against them by King Hussein. Many
PLO members were killed in this conflict and the remainder were driven
into Syria. The Syrians [Ref. 12:p. 2221 distrusted the PLO almost as
much as the Jordanians and forced large numbers of these refugees into
the Lebanon, a nation with a notoriously weak central government. While
in Lebanon, the PLO was able to launch raids into Israel as well as bring
the northern portions of Israeli settlements under artillery fire. [Ref. 12:p.
2221
B. ENEMY FORCES
The PLO in Lebanon was largely deployed in an area ranging from
Beirut south to the Israeli border. The total number of Palestinians in
this area was approximately 100,000, although of this total only about
15,000 could reasonably be described as fighters. Although equipment
was never a problem for the PLO (because of almost unlimited support
from the Soviets and other Arabs), effective utilization was another story.
The PLO has never been configured to utilize tanks, for example. Instead,
they would purchase them and position them in fixed sights. Similarly,
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the artillery they purchased was almost never directed against IDF tar-
gets. Rather, it was used to harass civilian population centers. Above all
else, it must be remembered that the PLO was configured as a guerilla
force, not a conventional army. [Ref. 4:p. 50]
Along with the PLO in Lebanon, the IDF was faced with elements of
the Syrian army. The Syrians had entered Lebanon in 1976 at the start
of the Lebanese Civil War in an attempt to separate warring factions.
They remained there, however, for reasons of their own. First, Syria had
long considered Lebanon as part of its country and harbored thoughts of
recapturing this nation [Ref. 4:p. 53]. Second, the Syrians knew that any
attack from the IDF into their country would most likely come through
the Bekka valley [Ref. 12:pp. 356-357]. It was here that they positioned
the preponderance of their force. In all, the Syrian force in Lebanon
totalled 30,000 men, 600 tanks, and 30 commando battalions [Ref.
4:p. 54].
C. FRIENDLY FORCES
Operation Peace for Galilee was the first war Israel fought where it
was not at a numerical disadvantage regarding its enemy. The IDF
launched the invasion on June 6, 1982 with its three active armored
divisions. This war did not result in a general recall [Ref. 13:p. 781 of the
reserve force, but four reserve armored divisions and several brigades of
mechanized infantry were mobilized for the invasion. In total, the IDF
would commit five armored divisions to the attack, along with an unde-
termined number of separate brigades. [Ref. 13 :p. 781
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The Israelis established three objectives prior to undertaking the
operation into Lebanon [Ref. 9:p. 2431. First, the IDF was to evict the PLO
from Lebanon. Second, Israel sought to engineer the election of Bashir
Gemayal as President of Lebanon- Gemayal was a man considered pro-
Israeli and sure to keep out the Palestinians. A final goal was to drive the
Syrians out of Lebanon.
D. OPERATIONS
The initial operational objectives of the move into Lebanon by the
IDF were limited in scope. At least publicly, the IDF was committed to
clearing the PLO up to 40 kilometers [Ref. 9:p. 2451 from their northern
border, basically out of artillery range. This limited objective did not, of
course, address all the war aims of the Israelis, most specifically driving
the Syrians out of Lebanon. This seeming inconsistency between national
goals and operational plans, in the author's opinion, plagued the IDF
throughout this operation. It seems clear in retrospect that the plan envi-
sioned by the Israeli Cabinet and briefed to the world was not consistent
with the larger objectives of Defense Minister Sharon.
The three active IDF divisions attacked along three different axes.
Each was to move rapidly, bypassing isolated resistance to maintain the
mobility of the attack. One division attacked up the western coast of
Lebanon, along the Mediterranean. Its mission was to drive the PLO from
the cities of Tyre and Sidon. [Ref. 12:p. 344]
The division in the center was to attack along the western slopes of
the Lebanese mountain range, with the ultimate objective of severing the
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Beirut-Damascus highway. Capturing this major line of communication,
it was hoped, would drive the Syrians out of Lebanon. [Ref. 12 :p. 3441
The division in the east was to attack into the PLO stronghold
known as 'Fatahland" as well as the Syrian-controlled Bekka valley. This
portion of the overall operation [Ref. 12:p. 3441 was aimed at securing the
eastern flank of the IDF against any possible Syrian counterattack. The
operational graphics for Operation Peace for Galilee are shown in Fig-
ure 8 [Ref. 3:p. 477].
E. RESULTS
IDF planners had anticipated that each of the attacking divisions
would achieve its objectives with relative ease. While this proved to be the
case in the west, the divisions in the center and the east ran into consid-
erable resistance [Ref.9:p. 2511. The terrain in the center resulted in
unsupported armor attacks along narrow roadways, where they met with
a series of Syrian ambushes. It was not until five full days into the opera-
tion that this division had achieved its objective and severed the Beirut-
Damascus highway. In the east, Syrian SAM batteries had severely
impeded Israeli ground forces. In a stunning military operation, much of
which is still highly classified, the IDF eliminated [Ref. 3:p. 4661 these
SAM sites, freeing up the ability of the ground forces to maneuver in the
Bekka valley.
The second stage of Operation Peace for Galilee was the siege of
Beirut. Trapped in the city was some 6500 Syrian soldiers and 11,000
PLO fighters. As Israeli forces encircled the Lebanese capital, the world
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political powers frantically attempted to arrive at an agreeable solution in
an effort to avoid a massacre. [Ref. 23:pp. 202-2031
The solution to the impasse was political, not miliLary. American
mediators were able, after weeks of fruitless negotiations, to obtain an
agreement calling for an evacuation by the PLO from the city of Beirut.
The agreement called for the Syrians to withdraw from the city, at which
time American, French, and Italian troops would assume responsibility
for evacuating the PLO over land and by sea. The PLO had agreed to this
plan only upon American assurances that civilians left behind would be
safe. This promise was brutally broken, however, when Phalangist sol-
diers massacred hundreds of PLO civilians in the camps of Sabra and
Shatila in the name of restoring order. [Ref. 9:p. 2571
Israel was held indirectly responsible for this massacre by an inquiry
board headed by one of its Supreme Court justices. Defense Minister
Sharon was forced to resign in February 1983 because of his failure to
take appropriate command precautions in the face of apparent warning
signs. The scars of this debacle ran much deeper, however. The IDF had
lost its moral standing in Israel. The long-standing national security con-
sensus which had been forged throughout its history was lost in the
quagmire of Lebanon. Israelis were uncertain as to the necessity of ever
having waged the war. Citizens protested on the streets of Tel Aviv,
demanding an immediate IDF withdrawal. However, the war dragged on
into 1984 until, after scaling down its objectives repeatedly, Israel was
able to forge a limited political agreement and extricate the IDF. [Ref.
9:pp. 256-2611
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From a military perspective, the IDF learned some valuable lessons
in the Lebanon War. First, a nation can win on the battlefield, yet lose a
war strategically. Second, there are real limits to the application of mili-
tary force. Third, a democracy like Israel, whose defense is based on a
militia army, cannot fight a war without the support of the public. [Ref.
9:pp. 261-2621
F. ANALYSIS
1. Inputs to the System
The years following the Yom Kippur war were a time of growth
throughout the IDF. In terms of sheer physical size as well as in terms of
technological advancements, the IDF was evolving into a large military
organization. As will be shown, these efforts at expanding force capabili-
ties were not without cost. First, however, the factors which led the IDF
to restructure will be analyzed.
a. The Threat
The threat of imminent, massive Arab invasion diminished
somewhat after the Yom Kippur war. The Egyptians and the Israelis
entered into peace talks which eventually resulted in the return of the
Sinai, the Camp David Accords, and a lessening of tensions on the
southern border. Nonetheless, the IDF responded to the near disaster of
having been surprised in the initial stages of the 1973 war. The long-
range threat to Israel, it was decided, was permanent and required con-




The IDF learned, at great cost, the tremendous increases in
weapons technology during the 1973 war. Arab infantrymen armed with
extremely accurate anti-tank missiles had almost devastated the Israeli
armored forces. Precision guided weapons were now a part of the Arab
arsenal and would have a tremendous impact on the IDF approach to
mechanized warfare.
Similarly, the Israeli Air Force found itself incapable of
influencing the ground battle due to the missile screens put up by the
sophisticated SAM batteries the Arabs had acquired from the Soviets. No
longer [Ref. 4:p. 181 could the IDF look at its air force as being a sort of
flying artillery. In fact, in 1973 the SAM sites were neutralized, not by the
IAF, but by armored forces which eventually were able to destroy the
missiles on the ground.
c. Socio-Economic Factors
The IDF has, throughout its history, served the needs of
Israel in roles other than national defense. The manpower problems fac-
ing the IDF appear to be systemic and long term because "...immigration
Just barely matches emigration...." [Ref. 11:p. 2161 Thus, Israel has
looked to the military to assist in some non-traditional roles [Ref. 4:p. 81.
First, in a nation of citizens of diverse cultures, the IDF has served a
nation-building role. Conscripts all learn a common language (Hebrew)
and have a shared common experience to take back to their civilian occu-
pation. Second, the IDF serves as one of the largest educational institu-
tions in Israel. In addition to military training, it sends soldiers to
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technical schools for skills which are of tremendous benefit to the civilian
economy. Last, the IDF is used to accelerate the upward mobility of those
who serve. The military service is seen in Israel as a means of social
advancement and a solid record of service is fundamental to long-term
success in Israeli society as a whole. [Ref. 4:pp. 8-101
d. A New Doctrine
The experiences of the 1973 war caused a fundamental
reevaluation of IDF doctrine. The lessons of this war pointed out the vul-
nerability of the tank when operating alone. This acknowledgement was
the driving force behind a restructuring of the IDF. The new doctrine
focused on a combined arms approach to fighting the next war. It still
looked at the tank as the major ground arm of combat but sought to
combine the capabilities of the other branches in a more effective
manner. [Ref. 12:p. 321]
The role of the infantry was expanded in this new doctrine.
Infantry forces were made totally mobile and capable of moving with or
even ahead of armored forces when required. Similarly, artillery was
given a newly defined role in the !DF. Previously, artillery had been rele-
gated to a back-up role in the IDF method of operations. After 1973, how-
ever, an entirely new branch of service was created for artillery and it was
fully equipped with highly mobile, self-propelled guns. [Ref. 24:p. 231
2. Organizational Structure
The dominant theme in analyzing the organizational restructur-
ing which occurred in the IDF after the 1973 war was growth. In all
areas, the decision was made to expand in size and, by default,
99
complexity. Inherent in any sort of transformation from a relatively small
force to a large, complex military machine are problems of bureaucracy,
mission focus, and command relationships. These problems will be
analyzed here.
a. Strategic Apex
Operation Peace for Galilee is, in the author's opinion, a
case study in miscommunication. At the highest levels of the Israeli gov-
ernment, there was confusion as to the goals and aims of this war.
Defense Minister Sharon is painted in the literature as the primary cul-
prit in expanding this war beyond the wishes of the cabinet. Yet the prob-
lem ran deeper than that. The institution of the Defense Ministry had
grown beyond control. It is the largest of the Israeli government's offices
in terms of budget and staff and it "...has been known to develop its own
contacts and relationships with various foreign governments, often
dictating policy to the Foreign ministry." [Ref. 9:p. 2311 Sharon, in the
author's opinion, was guilty of using his powerful position to accomplish
his own agenda, although with the limited complicity of the IDF Chief of
Staff. Problems ensued, however, when the members of the Israeli cabi-
net realized that the war was being expanded in direct contravention of
their stated aims. The resultant rift in the governmental leadership in the
midst of the conflict was not in the best interests of the IDF, which was
then engaged in combat. The resultant confusion [Ref. 9:p. 255] and
timidity in the operational conduct of the war proved costly to Israel from
both a military and political perspective.
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There has long been a debate surrounding the question of
control over the military establishment in Israel. In the Israeli system of
government, there is no provision for the post of Commander-in-Chief; in
theory, the entire cabinet maintains the ultimate command authority. By
default, however, these powers have been assumed by the Minister of
Defense, who serves as the link between the political and military in all
issues of national security in addition to running the ministry itself. In
the author's opinion, this is a basic organizational weakness in the IDF.
The Minister of Defense is placed in the almost untenable position of try-
ing to perform multiple national security roles while attempting to main-
tain allegiance to his political roots. His roles can sometimes blur,
resulting in Jurisdictional disputes with military and political leaders.
[Ref. 8:p. 98]
b. Middle Line and Operating Core
There was a tremendous expansion of the IDF after the
1973 war. In terms of both manpower and equipment, the face of the IDF
was restructured. The most striking example of the "new" IDF is that
while in 1973 it could deploy about six divisions, in 1982 it was capable
of deploying 15 fully mobilized divisions in 72 hours. The chart on the




Standing Forces 75,000 172,000
Israeli Army 61,500 135,000
Mobilized Reserve Capacity 275,000 450,000
Tanks 1,225 3,825
Fighting Vehicles 1,515 4,000
APCs 500 4,800
Self-Propelled Artillery 300 958
Military Budget (in dollars) 1.48 billion 7.3 billion
% of GNP 27.4 31.9
These figures represent, graphically, the changing orienta-
ticn away from the "all-tank" doctrine towards a more balanced com-
bined arms approach. Specifically, the growth of the infantry as well as
the advent of artillery as a new and important branch were indicative of
an attitude which sought to achieve a more balanced force capability.
c. Support Structure
The IDF incorporated many of the logistical lessons from
1973 into the restructuring of their organization prior to the invasion of
Lebanon. Yet, the support structure was really not tested during this
operation. First, stockpiles of all material were more than adequate for a
short war. Second, ground vehicles were in abundance and, when the
decision was made to utilize aircraft, C-130s were used with great effec-
tiveness to deliver supplies well forward in the battle area. (Ref. 4:p. 2101
The Israelis continued to make progress towards self-suffi-
ciency in the armaments area. Almost all small arms weaponry for the
ground forces is made in Israel, the armored force makes use of the
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domestically made Merkava tank, and even fighter aircraft production
was begun after 1973. The mission of the supporting staff of the IDF is to
maintain the capability to fight a sustained battle for 28 days [Ref. 4:p.
12]. Lessons from 1973 had been well learned and "from a logistic point
of view, the army was far superior to anything that had been known
hitherto." [Ref. 12:p. 354]
During Operation Peace for Galilee, the IDF standardized
its medical evacuation methods: The goal of the medical support system
in Israel is to treat the wounded as close to the front as possible. This is
accomplished in the IDF by positioning medical personnel carriers, with
doctors, across the entire front. Even some surgery is performed on the
battlefield in specially configured vehicles. [Ref. 4:p. 206]
d. Technostructure
The war in Lebanon saw the IDF for the first time imple-
ment a corps-level echelon. This new command structure was used due
to the diversity and size of the force committed to the operation. No
longer, it was felt, could a front commander adequately control three
divisions as well as follow-on forces [Ref. 4 :p. 76]. The increased role of
infantry and artillery dictated the requirement for an additional
command echelon.
e. Ideology
The ethical foundations of the IDF were severely tested dur-
ing this war. For the first time in its history, the IDF was called upon to
fight in an urban environment, with all the inherent dangers and moral
conflicts. The IDF operates within the doctrine of Tohar Haneshek [Ref.
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4:p. 1711, or purity of arms. Fundamentally, this doctrine calls for the
use of the defense forces only in defense of the Jewish state and the Jew-
ish population. The doctrine calls for extremely rigid rules of moral
behavior on the part of all IDF soldiers and extends to the treatment of
injured or captured enemy soldiers and civilians. The Israeli attempts to
clear the PLO from heavily populated areas were difficult given the nature
of their moral strictures. Soldiers were forbidden to throw hand grenades
into houses or use satchel charges, both common urban tactics. Instead,
the IDF attempted to maintain its moral legitimacy by offering warnings
to its enemies, even at the cost of increased Israeli casualties. They felt
that on balance their men would fight more effectively if they did not
harbor doubts about the morality of their operations [Ref. 4:p. 174].
While they were largely successful in their aims, it is also true that
"...dozens of officers and men chose to stand trial and serve jail sen-
tences rather than serve in Lebanon." [Ref. 9:p. 240]
3. Outputs of the System
a. Unity of Command
One of the results of the post-1973 restructuring of the IDF
had been a tendency towards more centralized command and control and
decision making. While these changes made sense on paper, many of
these new command characteristics proved ineffective in the opening
stages of Operation Peace for Galilee and were quickly discarded. [Ref.
4:p. 1961
The advances in technology had an impact on the com-
mand and control process in Lebanon. "Real-time" intelligence was
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available at each echelon of command. Television monitors linked divi-
sion, corps, and territorial command [Ref. 4:p. 1951. Although not a sig-
nificant problem in Lebanon, there is a concern among IDF leadership
that this real-time link may result in a diminished willingness of junior
leadership to seize the initiative and make on-the-spot decisions. The
other fear is that higher commanders will seize control of the fighting
given the technological capability to do so. [Ref. 4:p. 195]
The IDF forgot many of the basics of unity of command
during the invasion of Lebanon. Command integrity was not always
maintained, sometimes resulting in the presence of "...more than one
commander of equal rank in the same operation in which the force itself
was a combination of troops from both commanders." [Ref. 4:p. 196] This
uncharacteristic IDF action was, in the author's opinion, a result of a
lack of plans that matched stated goals as well as rapidly changing battle
conditions.
b. Maneuver
A basic tenet of military planning is that one must take into
account the mission, the enemy, the terrain to be fought on, and the
troops available to the planner. While the IDF plan appeared sound on
paper, it may not have adequately addressed the issue of terrain. The
lack of pure light infantry (the IDF infantry was mainly mechanized)
resulted in tanks leading attacks through mountain terrain. Proper tac-
tics would dictate that dismounted infantry should lead in terrain which
affords limited mobility, but the IDF sensitivity to casualties precluded
doing this.
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The attack on the Syrian SAM missile sites was, on the
other hand, an outstanding military maneuver [Ref. 12 :p. 3481. First, the
IDF sent remotely piloted vehicles across the battlefield, emitting signals
designed to confuse the SAM tracking systems into thinking real aircraft
were attacking. Once the SAM sites began tracking, their signals were
relayed to AWACS aircraft orbiting off the coast. The IAF then overflew
the area, gathering data and emitting signals designed to jam the SAM
tracking systems. Ground artillery units began to pound the pinpointed
SAM sites while LAF planes overflew, emitting chafe to confuse the
missile-tracking radar further. Israeli fighters then attacked to drop con-
ventional ordnance and "smart bombs" on the overmatched Syrian units
[Ref. 4:p. 991. The ability of the IDF to totally overwhelm the SAM batter-
ies was met with astonishment in military circles throughout the world
and added to its reputation as the dominant regional power.
c. Objective
As previously mentioned, the overall objectives of Operation
Peace for Galilee were never clearly defined. As early as five months
before the war, at least three war plans were circulated among the cabi-
net. Without detailing each plan, suffice it to say that each had funda-
mentally different objectives involving the PLO and the Syrians. The plan
ultimately approved by the cabinet was a vague combination of all three
and resulted in granting Sharon great leeway in pursuing an expanded
concept of the war. In retrospect, it seems that the policy makers moved
too quickly and without carefully detailing the specific objectives they
wished to accomplish. The result was a bogged-down affair in which IDF
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casualties mounted as the leadership sought a means to extricate Israel
from a war it never intended to wage.
G. THE ENVIRONMENT
In the author's opinion, the IDF at this period was operating in a
complex but stable environment. The rapid growth had certainly strained
the IDF as an organization, but the newly signed peace treaties with
Egypt had significantly stabilized the region. In effect, a great deal of the
variety to which the IDF had become accustomed was eliminated. This
new environment had influenced the organizational tendency back
toward a more centralized approach in the form of Defense Minister Ariel
Sharon. Additionally, the General Headquarters was instrumental in
influencing decisions at both the political and military levels. The central-
ization was countered somewhat with the creation of the corps-level
echelon to facilitate control with higher headquarters. [Ref. 4:p. 76]
As mentioned, much of this move towards command centralization
was quickly recognized as inappropriate and altered. Ground comman-
ders were judged to be moving tentatively [Ref. 9:p. 2511 based upon con-
fusing mission orders and stated objectives from higher headquarters.
The IDF senior leadership moved to reaffirm their belief that nothing
should impede the Junior leaders' willingness or capacity to make appro-
priate tactical decisions. [Ref. 24:p. 24]
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VIII. THE IDF TODAY
A. INTRODUCTION
The IDF has earned its international image as a battle-hardened
force capable of defending both the land [Ref. 25:p. 451 and the four mil-
lion people of Israel. Although the threat has varied from invasion by out-
siders to dispossessed inhabitants who wish to return to Israel on their
own terms, it has never diminished. The IDF remains the foundation for
the future of the state of Israel. The feeling persists among the citizenry
that if the IDF should ever falter or significantly weaken, then the sur-
vival of the nation is doubtful given the fact that it is surrounded by hos-
tile neighboring nations [Ref. 25:p. 451 whose populations exceed 47
million. Constraints on the budget after the Lebanon invasion once again
forced the IDF to restructure and reorganize. Perceived organizational
inefficiencies which had accumulated during the massive growth after
1973 were eliminated. The emphasis [Ref. 26:p. 481 was placed on creat-
ing a leaner but stronger force structure. Once again, this shows that the
willingness to adapt that has been so evident throughout its history is
present in today's IDF. In the author's opinion, the IDF continues to
adjust to the demands placed upon it by an ever-changing environment.
Most recently, the uprising in the occupied territories- the intifada-
has resulted in some restructuring and reorganizing by the IDF. A new
headquarters, the Field Forces Command (FFC), hos been established to
address readiness concerns. The FFC's mission is to maintain a focus on
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combat readiness, looking beyond the police duties of the intifada to the
task of preparing the IDF for future wars. [Ref. 24:p. 20]
The IDF is, understandably, very secretive about its current force
structure and capabilities. Therefore, this chapter is, by necessity, a
sampling of the current material available in open sources. In most
cases, where specific numbers of weapons and forces are cited there are
at least two sources whose numbers generally corroborate. The purpose
of this chapter is to show that a-continued emphasis exists on the part of
the IDF to respond within its organizational structure to system inputs
from its environment.
B. AFTER LEBANON: THE IDF OF TODAY
1. The Ground Forces
The key focus of the IDF's organizational structure remains on
maximizing readiness. In keeping with the constant need to address the
threat, the IDF has adopted "multi-mission formations" designed to be
adaptable to various combat situations [Ref. 24:p. 211. The ugdah (divi-
sion) remains the basic formation and usually is composed of several
armored brigades. Unlike the U.S. Army, there are no specially designed
light, heavy, or airborne divisions. The IDF maintains all armored divi-
sions [Ref. 2 6:p. 481, but these are designed to fight as combined arms
teams at all levels. When deployed for combat, the ugdah is allocated
elite infantry and special forces, while retaining organic artillery and
armored engineer support. Complete mobility has been achieved across
the entire spectrum of ground forces and most are armored. All have
been modified and refined based upon years of battle experience. Current
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estimates of IDF ground force strength are 130,000 active duty and
310,000 reservists. [Ref. 24:p. 24]
a. Armor
The armor branch has fully integrated the first Israeli-made
tank, the Merkava. These tanks are used predominantly in the elite,
active-duty brigades and saw extensive action in Lebanon. The IDF has
instituted a program [Ref. 24:p. 21] whereby modifications to the Mer-
kava are made constantly based upon field experience at unit level. It is
believed that this industry-unit cooperation is unique to the IDF and
results in fewer problems in new equipment integration. The Merkava
tank is unique in that its design is centered around crew protection.
Israel realizes that manpower is one of its most crucial resources and has
designed their main battle tank accordingly. Special designs include self-
sealing fuel tanks, fireproof ammunition containers, immediate fire sen-
sors and suppression system, and a main 105 mm gun [Ref. 4:p. 1981
that ranks among the world's best. An additional feature of the Merkava,
and an acknowledgement of the IDF's reaffirmation of combined arms
doctrine, is its ability to carry 10 infantrymen in a rear compartment.
The tank is the only one in the world that can be entered from the rear.
[Ref. 4:p. 199]
The reserve armored brigades are equipped with upgraded
versions of Centurion or M60 Patton tanks. Product improvements
include add-on reactive armor suits, advanced fire control systems, and
fire suppression equipment to enhance crew survivability. [Ref. 24:p. 21]
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b. Infantry
Lessons from Lebanon have convinced the IDF leadership
of the need for mobile infantry forces that have the training and capabil-
ity to conduct extensive dismounted operations. This new thinking has
evolved despite the traditional Israeli fear of unacceptable loss of life in
dismounted actions [Ref. 4:p. 203). Although recent activities in the
occupied territories have occupied the elite infantry units in police-type
operations, repeated efforts have been made to balance this work with
training in the soldiers' actual combat missions. [Ref. 24:p. 21]
The IDF currently maintains a fleet of between 4,000 and
5,000 armored personnel carriers. Among these are a number of Soviet-
made BTR-60s that have been captured in previous conflicts. The IDF
has developed the necessary logistics ability to fully integrate and utilize
these vehicles for its own purposes. [Ref. 25:p. 461
c. Engineers
The engineer branch has found a renewed prominence in
the combined arms orientation of the IDF. Used to assist the forward
movement capabilities of the armor and the infantry, the engineers have
been furnished equipment [Ref. 4:p. 2091 that rates among the best in
the world. Special systems have been designed to overcome obstacles,
destroy enemy fortifications, and provide hasty road and bridge con-
struction capability. [Ref. 24.:p. 21]
d. Artillery
The once-neglected branch of artillery continues to flourish
now in the IDF. Artillery assets [Ref. 25:p. 471 include between 2,000 and
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2,500 artillery pieces, of which about 1,000 are self-propelled. Officers of
artillery undergo basic training in the infantry or armor branch to give
them a broader understanding of their support roles. Additionally,
research in advanced technology artillery weapons is continuing in the
area of fire direction centers and precision navigation equipment. [Ref.
24:p. 2]
2. The Israeli Air Force
The IAF relies on better-trained pilots to maintain air superiority
in the region. It is considered the most prestigious of the services and
attracts the highest-quality volunteers "i ining is arduous, both men-
tally and physically, but thr select few [Ref. 9:p. 1531 who accomplish the
program are welcomed into a service renowned for high morale and
esprit. At a time when other services are experiencing drastic budgetary
cutbacks, the IAF is growing in strength. Defense Minister Rabin
"...favors channeling the best and most resources to the boys in blue..."
and refuses to consider that the days of airplanes influencing the battle-
field may be past [Ref. 27:p. 311. The IAF currently maintains approxi-
mately 600 aircraft, with the primary fighter being the American-made
F-16. [Ref. 25:p. 471
3. The Israeli Navy
The naval branch of the IDF, although the smallest with approx-
imately 6,600 men, nevertheless fills a vital national security mission.
Based largely off the coast of Israel, the navy must contend with neN'al
forces of Libya, Syria, Lebanon, and the PLO. Efforts to upgrade the mis-
sile capability within the navy are continuing with the planned building
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of three 1,100-ton missile-capable boats [Ref. 25:p. 481. In addition,
plans call for upgrading the current fleet of three diesel submarines with
higher-performing vessels. The role of the navy in the future should con-
tinue to be one of deterrence aimed at protecting the Israeli coasts as well
as shipping and access to the Mediterranean Sea. [Ref. 2 5 :p. 481
4. Nuclear Weapons
A topic of significant concern and importance in the current
Israeli strategic approach to national defense is their position on nuclear
weapons. The attitude of the Israelis, although somewhat clouded by
secrecy, is evident by way of recent policy actions and statements. The
Israelis have long proclaimed a strategic imperative calling for a reserva-
tion of the right to "...destroy the nuclear stockpile of any Arab country
at war with Israel if there are grounds to believe that the country is man-
ufacturing nuclear weapons." [Ref. 9:p. 1191 It was with this premise in
mind that Israel moved to destroy the Iraqi nuclear reactor on June 7.
1981 [Ref. 3:p. 3831.
Coupled with its stated intention to destroy any enemy Arab
nuclear capability is the widely held belief that Israel possesses either the
technology to produce nuclear weapons or the weapons themselves.
Defense Minister Dayan, during the darkest moments of the Yom Kippur
War, was known to have actively considered an option to use these "last
resort" weapons [Ref. 1 1:p. 2201. It is also a known fact that Israel has
produced the Jericho rocket (range- 300 miles) to counter Soviet-
supplied SCUD rockets in Egypt and Syria (range- 500 miles). The
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suspicion exists that Israel has the capability of arming these Jericho
rockets with warheads in the 20 kiloton range. [Ref. 1 l:p. 2201
Israel has long denied these rumors of nuclear capability and
has vowed not to be the first to introduce them into the region [Ref. 8:p.
3301. On the other hand, it has refused to sign the nuclear nonprolifera-
tion treaty and has openly acknowledged a capability to produce these
weapons if warranted [Ref. 9:p. 119. This somewhat contradictory posi-
tion is believed calculated to achieve a deterrent effect. This approach,
described as a "...bomb in the basement" policy, forces the Arabs to be
respectful of a possible IDF stockpile of nuclear weapons and of the
Israeli willingness to use them if the existence of the state were ever
seriously called into question. [Ref. 9:p. 1201
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE IDF
One of the unchanging operational norms in the IDF since its incep-
tion in 1948 has been the concept that leaders control their men from
the front. Despite tremendous gains in technology, this continues to be
the philosophy, despite its high cost in leader casualties. (In Lebanon, for
example, tactical combat leaders suffered almost 40 percent of the casu-
alties [Ref. 24:p. 24].) This is not to say that the IDF ignores the advan-
tages of the developing technologies. On the contrary, the IDF is making
use of the latest C2 technology, including "integrated networks for
electronics and optical and data transmissions at the tactical command
level [to] provide accurate information for all-arms fire control." [Ref.
24:p. 24] Leaders are trained to use the data transmission and display
consoles, but not at the expense of personally leading their soldiers. IDF
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policy dictates that the commander will "...never send his men into
battle; his place will always be where the action is, where he can see to
lead, and where he can be seen by his troops." [Ref. 24:p. 241 The IDF
has evolved in terms of its command structures at the highest level and
performs research designed to aid the commander in the art of military
decision making.
1. The Command Structure
Figure 9 depicts in blck diagram format the unique command
structure which exists in the strategic apex of today's IDF [Ref. 8:p. 97].
The truly unique feature of the IDF remains in the unified General Staff
which controls all branches of the defense forces, to include the Navy
and the Air Force. The Chief of Staff acts as the head of the entire force
[Ref. 8:p. 951 and is the only member of the military service who is
granted access to the political branch of the government. Permanent
members of the General Staff along with the chief include the comman-
ders of the Air Force, Navy, and Armor Corps as well as the three Area
Commanders (Northern, Central, and Southern). The four branches of
the General Staff depicted on Figure 9 are responsible for supervising a
number of inspectorates. For example, the armor inspectorate is respon-
sible for the training and development of operational procedures for all
tank and mechanized infantry forces [Ref. 8:p. 951. This command struc-
ture provides the Chief of Staff with a dual control measure. While he
controls forces through an operational chain of command (area, divi-
sional, brigade), he also maintains technical supervision of the forces
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through the inspectorates of one of the branches of the General Staff.
[Ref. 8:p. 96]
The political sector controls the military through the Minister of
Defense, as depicted in Figure 10 [Ref. 8:p. 1001. This powerful position
is, in practice, the Supreme Commander of the IDF. The office of the
Defense Ministry has evolved, in Mintzberg terms, into the technostruc-
ture of the modem IDF. The ministry is charged with providing the IDF
with administrative and technical support while freeing the military to
concentrate on matters relating more to the conduct of military opera-
tions. In actuality, these roles are sometimes confused and cause friction
at the highest leadership levels of the IDF. [Ref.8:p. 981
2. Decision Making
The ultimate goal of any command and control system, in the
author's opinion, is a decision made by the commander which can be
translated into timely actions on the battlefield. Much work has been
done within the IDF focusing on the inherent problems of mission plan-
ning and command decision making [Refs. 28, 291. One approach to this
issue will be examined in detail after some background in the area has
established a foundation.
In his article "Strategies of Decision Making" [Ref. 30:pp. 1-71.
Gary A. Klein outlines the phenomenon of decision making in an excel-
lent fashion. He argues that there are two methods of decision making:
"...analytical ways and recognitional ways and that we must understand
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Mr. Klein points out that there are two different ways to make
decisions. The analytical approach follows the following rigid procedure.
First, options are generated based upon the perceived requirements of
the situation. Next, criteria are established for analyzing the various
options. Weights are then assigned to these criteria and the options eval-
uated. The prudent decision maker is then supposed to select the option
that proves optimal. This approach is most practical, from a military
standpoint, at the corps level and higher, where there is apt to be ample
time for the decision.
A second decision-making method follows what Klein calls a
more recognitional approach. This approach utilizes the decision maker's
experience to recognize a situation as familiar. This ability to recognize
the situation allows the decision maker to eliminate the need for the
time-consuming analytical approach and facilitates a rapid response.
The IDF is doing work aimed at focusing attention and better
understanding on this decision-making process. While its literature does
not categorize decisions exactly as Klein, a good deal of its work can be
seen as overlapping his. One of its approaches [Ref. 28:p. il is to analyze
selected case studies within the context of a decision-making model. In
the IDF's own words, "...multiple-dimensional analysis schema is appli-
cable to study the complexities that are involved in the decision making
processes of brigade and division commanders during combat." [Ref.
28:p. 33] In essence, the IDF selects a crucial decision made during a
recent conflict. Care is taken to insure that the case is analyzed with an
appropriate deference to the general background and setting of the
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problem. This is to put the decision in perspective and not try to isolate it
as a discrete event to be analyzed independently of additional related
activities.
The second parameter in the model accounts for the partici-
pants in the decision. While, the focal person is invariably the comman-
der, it is important to include other players (e.g., staff and other
commanders) and clearly identify their positions and roles. [Ref. 28:p. 291
A third input into the model is the location of the decision
maker. Account is taken as to the physical setting of the commander as
well as the manner in which he was able to receive pertinent information,
either via radio communications or directly through eyesight impression.
[Ref. 28:p. 29]
The fourth model input Is the pressures facing the decision
maker; these are accounted for and summed Into four categories. The
first category attempts to Judge the amount of time pressure faced by the
commander. Second, the pressures from an organizational standpoint
are examined. In this category, the amount of pressure the commander
was under from both his organizational superiors as well as subordinates
is taken into account. The third category is the combat consequences
parameter and implies the immediate consequences the commander
faces given any of the decision alternatives. The last category accounts
for the physical danger the commander is under. [Ref. 28:pp. 29-30]
The main focus of the model is upon the information processing
done by the commander. There are acknowledged problems in attempting
to model information processing. While some elements of the processing
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of information can be observed directly (e.g., active information search,
information transmitted, and alternatives raised by decision partici-
pants), other activities have to be more indirectly inferred. Nevertheless,
the Israeli model attempts to gauge such things as extent of information
gathering, the type of information most frequently sought by the com-
mander (not surprisingly, this turns out to be location and fighting con-
dition of his own subordinate units), and the willingness to generate
alternative decisions. [Ref. 28:pJ5. 31-331
The final portion of the model attempts to draw conclusions as
to whether the decision-making process achieved the outcome desired by
the commander. Research continues in detailing the relationship
between the decisional process and its consequence. [Ref. 28:p. 33]
D. TRAINING THE FORCE
The Field Forces Command (FFC) has proven its worth in the IDF. It
has successfully organized large-scale combined arms exercises despite
the obvious distractions [Ref. 24:p. 21] caused by the intifada. Training
the force is a priority in the IDF for both the active-duty soldiers and the
reserves (where one in six Israeli citizens serve). [Ref. 31 :p. 267]
. Training the Reserve Force
The reserve forces of the IDF can be required to train for up to
60 days per year [Ref. 25:p. 501. Most reservists are assigned to a partic-
ular unit, however, and train about one day per month with a 31-day
annual recall. Reserve officers are required to train an extra seven days
[Ref. 32:p. 211. Needless to say, this puts a tremendous strain on Israel's
economy, and improved training techniques are constantly sought to
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maximize the training time which is available. In particular, the IDF has
incorporated computer simulation training that "...ranges from war gam-
ing to tank gunnery and individual weapons training." [Ref. 25:p. 501
Almost all available training time is devoted to increasing or refreshing
combat fighting skills.
A significant difference exists between the U.S. and IDF tech-
nique for training the reserve forces. In the U.S., reservists are largely
responsible for training themselves. In the IDF, the active forces manage
and train the reservists. In fact, active-duty officers are frequently placed
in command of r-cve units. [Ref. 32:p. 19]
2. Trairng the Active Force
Although the active-duty forces are committed to actual security
responsibilities, from riot control in the West Bank and Gaza to counter-
terrorist activities along and beyond Israel's borders, training for a possi-
ble major conflict must nonetheless occur. The FFC is responsible for
establishing long-range training schedules designed to rotate combat
units through this myriad of responsibilities. [Ref. 24:p. 201
As are the reservists in their training, the active portion of the
IDF is pursuing the latest technologies [Ref. 33:p. 491 in computer simu-
lation techniques. The emphasis on simulation training in the IDF is
upon supplementing and improving Its proven battlefield techniques with
the aid of computer graphics and variations. The IDF strongly resists
making doctrinal changes based on the results of simulations and
prefers to rely on what few modern armies possess- recent combat
experience. [Ref. 33:p. 491
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One part of the training program of the IDF which is in no way
simulated is the rigid physical fitness regimen required of all its soldiers.
The IDF program differs from that of the U.S. in that each branch of the
service designs a program that suits the military tasks its soldiers must
perform. For example, while the program for the infantry emphasizes
strength, endurance, and flexibility, the program for pilots stresses
endurance, coordination, and strengthening of the neck, back and abdo-
men muscles [Ref. 34:p. 59].
Instead of a long morning run, the soldiers of the IDF are
required to run just two kilometers, but in 6 to 10 minutes. The entire
physical training period lasts only about 15 to 20 minutes. [Ref. 34:p. 591
E. THE FUTURE OF THE IDF
There is ample evidence that the IDF will continue to constantly
evaluate its position and structure its forces accordingly. The most recent
references from Israel indicate a continuing debate about resource alloca-
tion and prioritization within the defense forces. The debate over
resource allocations is not viewed by Israel in isolation, however. The
U.S. provides Israel with a substantial portion of its military budget in
the form of aid. With this assistance come various pressures and con-
straints [Ref. 35:p. 1511. The U.S. uses its aid package to Israel to further
its own foreign policy interests in the region. It follows, therefore, that aid
is either extended to support those objectives or can be withheld as a
bargaining tool when those objectives seem threatened. For example, one
type of leverage incorporated into all military aid agreements concluded
by the United States is the pledge that the aid will be used to purchase
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arms only for defensive purposes and forbids transference of the arms
received to third parties without U.S. consent [Ref. 35 :p. 1511. Con-
straints such as these and others influence procurement and doctrinal
decisions in the IDF. The Lavi fighter aircraft program, for example, was
cancelled based, at least partially, on a U.S. reluctance to fund a massive
jobs program in Israel when American-made fighters were available on an
"off the shelf' basis [Ref. 27:p. 311. In general, it can be said that Israel is
forced to consider factors of a broader nature than just its own national
security when making decisions regarding allocation of scarce resources.
More specifically, the current budget question centers on the inte-
gration of the technologically advanced precision-guided weapons (PGW)
as a prominent part of the overall defense concept. The debate has esca-
lated because of constraints in the Israeli defense budget. Maintenance of
the large standing force which came out of the Yom Kippur War has
placed a tremendous burden on an already-strained Israeli economy.
On one side of the debate are those who wish to maintain the status
quo and merely upgrade existing weapons systems and force structure.
Their position is summed up by Deputy Defense Minister Israel Tal, who
said, "We must put emphasis on large ground forces, giving clear priority
to mobile and armored divisions, which alone can carry the offensive
deep into enemy territory." [Ref. 27:p. 291
His position is one of the entrenched bureaucracy and has, after all,
been the concept that has worked so well for the IDF over the years. This
group points out that the death of the tank has been predicted almost
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since its inception on the battlefield, yet with each new generation pro-
duced, its capabilities and dominance seem to grow.
On the other side is a group which argues that the purpose of war
has changed away from taking land to destroying enemy forces and that
the IDF must change to acknowledge this difference. This position is
summed up by General (Reserve) Hayim Yavetz, who recently said,
The armies of the world are rigid organizations and we, like every-
body else, are stupidly built according to regiments, companies, and
divisions, instead of establishing units that can neutralize the
numeric force of the enemy. [Ref. 27:p. 30]
The promise of PGW is that with proper investment in the technology
research, there will be no need for maintaining a large standing ground
army. This group, which contains the IDF Chief of Staff Shomron, is
clearly gaining influence. Defense Minister Rabin has spoken of change
and of scaling back the size of the army with an eye towards adjusting to
"future objectives." [Ref. 27:p. 31]
Continued production of the Merkava tank, coupled with suitable
investment in PGW research and development, seems the most likely
course of action for the IDF [Ref. 27:p. 31]. While this may ultimately
appease neither side in the debate, it will avoid a potentially dangerous
split in the leadership of Israel.
Framed in the context of this thesis, the Israelis show no signs of
becoming organizationally rigid. In no way do they appear ready to rest
on their laurels as the region's dominant military force. Instead, active
debate is encouraged as a means to positively identify those environmen-




This thesis has traced the growth and organizational development of
the IDF from its inception to the present. In conjunction with this effort,
lessons of use in the study of the military art have been extracted from
the numerous conflicts in which the IDF has fought.
In the author's opinion, in order to maintain a qualitative advantage,
the IDF has exhibited a willingness and an ability to adapt in the areas of
doctrine, organization, planning, and decision making at the highest
national and military levels. The IDF has responded in a manner which
suggests a sophisticated understanding of the fact that it operates as
part of an open system embedded in a changing environment. As such,
the organization is subject to inputs from the environment. Sometimes
the varied nature of these inputs requires systemic change and adapta-
tion. It is in this respect that the evolution of the IDF is a study in orga-
nizational adaptability.
In formulatin'g some final thoughts as to the nature of the IDF and
the ability to transfer lessons from one organization to another, one is
struck by the thought that while the IDF is similar in some respects to
other military forces, in many ways it is a unique entity. Its largely militia
nature distinguishes it from the U.S. military, for example, as does its
bank of recent combat experience. On the other hand, as the IDF has
grown in size and complexity, many of the bureaucratic inefficiencies
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common to other large combat organizations have appeared. With these
factors in mind, then, some general observations and conclusions are
appropriate and necessary. These conclusions will be broken into two
parts: historical constants for the military art and lessons from an orga-
nizational perspective.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MILITARY ART
While the tactics of the IDF have changed dramatically as changes in
the threat, available technology for weapons systems, and various social
and economic factors have affected doctrine, the strategy employed by
Israel in 1948 remains remarkably consistent with that of today.
1. Strategy
In large measure, the strategy initially adopted by Israel was
due to its geography. The lack of any real strategic depth means, above
all, that Israel cannot allow the enemy any significant penetration of its
territory. Trading space for time would be disastrous. It is because of this
fact that throughout its history Israel has put an enormous reliance
upon its ability to quickly mobilize the reserve force. [Ref. 4:p. 141
A second constant of Israeli strategy remains the "fast war"
theory. Due to the sensitive nature of the Middle East and the global
interest in the region's oil supply, Israel has long known that protracted
conflicts would be harmful to its national interest. Intervention by the
global superpowers has long been the norm and has resulted in the IDF
goal of achieving a quick yet decisive military victory. [Ref. 20:p. 91
A third leg of the strategy involves close linkage between politi-
cal and military aims and objectives. Since the Arab enemy can never be
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fully defeated on the battlefield, the Israelis have long sought to achieve
political gains through military victories. The Israelis feel they must be in
a position to offer the Arabs something in exchange for desirable political
settlements. [Ref. 20:p. 9]
A fourth factor in Israel's strategy is its emphasis on the role of
the entire state in the nation's defense. In this way, the effects of war are
felt across the entire population and affect the war-fighting manner.
Each life is considered precious and any casualties are cause for mourn-
ing in the entire nation. This deep human concern helps to shape the
strategy that guides deployment decisions within the IDF. [Ref. 4:p. 14]
2. Tactics
The IDF has established itself as one of the premier fighting
forces in the world. While the strategy has remained remarkably con-
sistent, the tactics of the IDF have evolved to reflect changing
circumstances.
a. 1948
The problem of the few against the many caused the IDF to
structure Its initial tactics [Ref. 2 0 :p. 101 away from attrition warfare
toward close combat. Instead of fighting to the objective, darkness and
stealth were used to allow the IDF to fight on the objective. The superior-
ity of the enemy's firepower was negated because most of the combat
took place at close quarters, forcing the battle to "...man against man.
grenade against grenade." [Ref. 20:p. 101
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b. 1956
The Sinai campaign was the first of the modem wars and
the IDF's initial experience at mobile warfare. The open desert terrain of
the Sinai was ideal for the rapid movement of tanks and light vehicles.
The success of the armored units in attacking through the Egyptians'
defenses signalled the ascendancy of the tank in IDF doctrine. [Ref.
4:p. 17]
c. 1967
In the Six-Day War, tactics were focused around the main
battle tank. All other forces were reconfigured to support the tank,
including the infantry, artillery, and air force. The tactic of striking the
first blow was used to ultimate effect in the preemptive air strike, which
freed IDF ground forces to overwhelm the Arabs with a combination of
firepower and maneuver. [Ref. 20:p. 111
d. 1973
The integration of anti-armor weapons into the Arab forces
resulted in the failure of the IDF pure tank doctrine. The IDF was forced
to engage in attritional tactics, using armor against infantry strongpoints
at a tremendous cost in men and equipment. The inability of the IAF to
gain air superiority resulted in limited support for IDF ground forces.
Only daring tactics such as the seizure of the west bank of the Suez,
coupled with the skills of the IDF tank crews on the Golan Heights, saved
the day for the Israelis.
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e. 1982
The lessons of the Yom Kippur War resulted in an IDF
whose tactics were oriented more along a doctrine of combined arms. The
attack launched into Lebanon reflected this approach with increased
roles for infantry, artillery, engineers, and the air force. The lack of clear
political goals and will resulted in some problems at the tactical level,
however, with units fighting tentatively, particularly in urban areas
where concern over casualties dominated military considerations.
C. THE MODEL'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY
1. The Environment
The environment has had a great impact upon the IDF as an
organization. The amount of variety, or possible states of nature, in the
system has determined, over time, the level of command centralization,
as well as influencing the degree of standardization within the IDF. As
the environment increased in complexity, the IDF has shown a clear ten-
dency toward decentralization of command authority concomitant with a
move toward standardization of organizational process.
2. The Inputs to the System
The inputs discussed throughout this thesis are not all-
inclusive. To be sure, another author might select other equally impor-
tant inputs to an organization as complex and pervasive as the IDF. Yet,
in specifying the threat, technology, and socio-economic factors, the case
was presented that the IDF, as an organization, had to be responsive to
changing priorities and forces acting external to it. The willingness of the
IDF to engage in self-assessment is one of its strongest assets. Rather
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than operate in an organizational vacuum, the IDF has responded to a
varying threat, increased technological advances on both sides, and com-
plex domestic socio-economic problems. This can be seen most clearly in
its doctrine [Ref. 4:p. 161, which has gone through four major phases.
including individual infantry, mobile light vehicle, pure tank, and now
combined arms. Each of these doctrines has directly followed from an
IDF evaluation of the threat, available technology, and impact on the
social and economic fabric of its vulnerable nation.
3. The Organizational Structure
In establishing the model used throughout this thesis, a viable
organization was depicted as consisting of six interrelated entities [Ref.
5:p. 116). The strategic apex, middle line, operating core, support struc-
ture or staff, technostructure, and ideology were identified as basic to
every organization. The remainder of this thesis was devoted to tracking
and examining the changing nature of these parts of the IDFs organiza-
tion, on examining the inputs which have most effected change, and the
resultant effect on system outputs or combat capabilities. The organiza-
tional structure, by way of summary, has evolved in the IDF in the fol-
lowing manner.
a. 1948
The newly created state of Israel had, in 1948, created a
functional, if overly simplified, defense force that proved capable of
defeating the combined armies of five neighboring Arab nations. The stra-
tegic apex of the fledgling IDF consisted largely of one man, Prime Minis-
ter David Ben-Gurion. His dominance resulted from the frenetic nature of
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the environment in the region as well as an absence of national Institu-
tions of any sort. The middle line and operating core of the IDF were
structured around the strengths of the untrained, yet motivated, Israeli
citizen-soldier. This backbone of the IDF was shaped by the realization
that the survival of the state depended upon their performance on the
battlefield. The leaders of this group were trained to eliminate the techno-
logical and numerical strengths of the enemy through use of night,
stealth, and close combat skills. The support structure and technostruc-
ture of the IDF during the War of Independence grew in response to the
needs of the fighting force. Mutual adjustment- a means of coordination
between commanders on the ground-was the method of achieving the
minimal required organizational standardization. The ideology of the IDF
was firmly rooted in 1948 in the collective Jewish memory of the atroci-
ties of the Holocaust and other religious persecutions. This collective
sense of purpose and will was effectively used by Ben-Gurion in structur-
ing a viable organization.
b. 1956
The period of relative calm following the War of Indepen-
dence was used by the IDF leadership to work toward formalization and
centralization of the organizational process. In response to social and
economic factors, as well as the ever-present threat, the IDF focused its
collective attention on standardizing the militia nature of the force. The
strategic apex was still, in the author's opinion, largely focused in one
man, now Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan. His visionary leadership, coupled
with a charismatic personality, set the tone of bravado and spirit which
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has remained an IDF trademark. He worked to institutionalize, in the
middle line, the Israeli leader's perceived capacity for initiative and bold
action through command and control doctrine. The operating core was
structured according to the Defense Service Law, which recognized the
inability of Israel to maintain a large standing force, and relied upon well-
trained reserve soldiers. The technostructure and support structure were
still not formalized and operated internal to the fighting units. Lateral
coordination was the main nmnner in which support problems were
resolved. The ideology of the IDF was firmly grounded in the moral stand-
ing offered in the Bible, which quotes specific tactical instructions given
as the word of God to the people of Israel. This spiritual legitimacy was
used as another tool to bind the IDF as an organization.
c. 1967
The period after the 1956 Sinai campaign saw a fundamen-
tal evaluation of the structure of the IDF. Increasing technological capa-
bilities of weapons systems, a threat that was heavily supported by the
Soviet Union, a rapidly expanding domestic economy, and an affirmation
of a mobile warfare doctrine combined to influence the very nature of the
IDF as an organization. Although the changes were dramatic, they were
instituted in a gradual manner and evolved over the decade due to readi-
ness concerns. At the strategic apex level, the increased complexity of the
organization resulted in a more dominant role by the General Headquar-
ters of the IDF. The threat faced on multiple fronts called for a command
and control apparatus and structure able to effectively allocate limited
combat resources. The middle line was a more standardized entity which
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sought to train and educate IDF leaders in staff as well as command
positions. Focus in the operating core was placed upon training the com-
mon soldier in the face of an increasingly complex battlefield. This com-
plexity precipitated, as well, a more formalized support structure which
was designed along the "push" system of resupply. The mobile warfare
doctrine dictated this system as a means of alleviating resupply concerns
in the mind of the maneuver commander. This increased system com-
plexity also resulted in a technostructure that formalized a divisional sys-
tem and recognized the need for rapid and flexible task organization. The
ideology of the IDF affirmed the Israeli respect for the sanctity of human
life and an organizational objective of minimizing both friendly and
enemy casualties.
d. 1973
Despite an overwhelming success in the Six-Day War, the
IDF underwent a radical restructuring in the years prior to 1973. The
changes which occurred in the IDF during this period were brought
about, once again, by a complex array of factors. In some instances, an
improper interpretation of factors resulted in organizational failures. The
strategic apex had become fouled in a confused command structure
which deteriorated in the chaos of the war's first days. This lack of clear
C2 proved nearly fatal to the initial orchestration of forces on the South-
ern Front. The middle line and operating core were hampered by an
incorrect organizational interpretation of the results of the 1967 war. The
.all-armor" doctrine was limited in its ability to deal with the increased
capability of anti-tank weaponry in the hands of the Arab infantryman.
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Organizational adjustments were required in the course of the war to
overcome this deficiency. Lack of allied support in 1967 precipitated a
move on the part of the support structure to decrease foreign dependency
by increasing domestic weapon production. Similarly, the technostruc-
ture had responded to the nature of the threat by standardizing the divi-
sion in order to achieve a wider span of control for the maneuver com-
mander. This move towards centralization had the undesired effect, how-
ever, of limiting the small unit's capability to flexibly respond to a variety
of threats.
e. 1982
The years following the Yom Kippur War were a time for
profound growth throughout the IDF. This move toward growth brought
predictable organizational problems, including increased complexity. The
push towards growth followed directly from an acknowledgement that the
threat to Israel was permanent and would never diminish. Predictable
conflicts arose between the military sector and the civilian economy as
they competed for scarce manpower resources. The increasingly complex
organization brought about a strategic apex that, once again, become
dominated by one strong individual. Defense Minister Sharon came to
dominate this war through his willingness to use his powerful position to
achieve his own agenda. The middle line and operating core were in the
process of transitioning from the "all-armor" force structure to one which
emphasized combined arms in all actions. Entire branches of the ground
forces, especially infantry and artillery, were given increased roles and
importance in the new force structure. The suppo .- structure had grown
135
and formalized to the point where it could logistically support the IDF
during a multi-front war for a period of 28 days. The increased size of the
force resulted in the technostructure implementing a corps-level com-
mand echelon to alleviate the excessive span of control demanded of the
Front commander. The legitimacy of this operation fundamentally shook
the IDF at its foundations, however, as soldiers were called upon to fight
in urban terrain with all the inherent problems and increased casualties.
For the first time, the IDF experienced combat refusals whereby officers
and soldiers chose jail over combat.
f. The IDF of Today: 1990
Currently, the IDF is working, in keeping with its adaptive
heritage, to fit within changing roles and differing missions within Israel.
The GHQ has established a Field Forces Command to provide a clear
means of maintaining focus on combat readiness in the face of such
internal distractions as the intifada. Ongoing competition for scarce
resources has resulted in a more responsive training systein that relies
upon increasingly sophisticated computer war games and simulations
designed to maximize limited training time. The IDF is presently evaluat-
ing its long-term force structure, again, in light of increasingly capable
precision-guided weapons. Emphasis appears to be shifting away from
armor-dominated ground forces toward a more balanced force which
incorporates the most modem weaponry available.
4. The Outputs of the System
It is, at least to this author, somewhat remarkable that
although the IDF has undergone numerous organizational
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restructurings, the ability to effectively accomplish its mission has never
wavered. There are numerous reasons for this repeated success,
including the strong motivation of IDF soldiers who are, quite literally,
fighting for national survival. In essence, the IDF has been able to
maintain a qualitative advantage over its adversaries in both equipment
and men. Thus, when General Israel Tal speaks of "superior technology"
[Ref. 4:p. 13], he is referring not only to superior weaponry but also to
maintaining the qualitative edge in manpower so evident in IDF history.
D. ADAPTABILITY-WHY AN IDF STRENGTH?
One question which remains to be addressed concerns the very
nature of the IDF. Is there some special quality in this organization
which promotes self-assessment and, in turn, change? In this author's
opinion, there are at least two possible reasons for its proclivity to adapt.
1. Cultural
An IDF officer who questions methodology or current opera-
tional practice is normally not chastised. Quite the contrary, dissent is, if
not encouraged, at least expected in the ethnically and socially diverse
Israeli Defense Force. Officers who perceive improper or inefficient
actions are allowed to lodge complaints, even against their commanders,
without fear of losing their careers. After the 1956 war, for example, two
battalion commanders demanded an investigation of their brigade com-
mander's conduct, alleging that he had "...not shown due care in the
moral application of force since he did not take due care to protect his
men and civilians in the battle area." [Ref. 4:p. 172] Although the case
proved insignificant, It is important to note that both the battalion
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commanders went on to become IDF Chiefs of Staff and the accused bri-
gade commander, Ariel Sharon, the Defense Minister [Ref. 4:p. 172]. This
small example is some proof of the open conditions which exist in the
IDF and reflects an organizational willingness toward self-assessment.
Culturally, it has been said that the Jews lack any semblance of
military tradition. This fact allowed the formation of the military, and its
continued evolution, to be- based upon original methods and unique
approaches [Ref. 8:p. 54]. One author points out that
junior leaders were encouraged to speak their minds freely, bringing
fresh ideas to the attention of their seniors. This would sometimes
lead to extremes and was not always welcome, but the IDF has
always prided itself on its relative lack of convention and its flexibil-
ity and, as the record shows, this has been mostly to its advantage
in battle. [Ref. 10:pp. 21-22]
Since many of the IDF's wars have been waged at the company level and
below, the ability to foster innovative thinking at the junior officer ranks
has, in the author's opinion, directly contributed to success on the
battlefield.
2. Combat Experience
There remains the very distinct possibility that the IDF has
been extraordinarily adaptable simply because it has fought seven wars
in slightly more than 40 years. Combat experience has a unique capacity
to focus a military's attentions on real or perceived weaknesses. The IDF
has retooled and restructured periodically, only to find that minor, and
sometimes major, alterations were required. After each conflict, the IDF
leadership has evaluated lessons learned and funnelled these into its
doctrine, trying to capitalize on experience gained while fighting.
138
Although on occasion lessons have been misread or improperly imple-
mented (i.e., the pure tank doctrine), on balance, the !DF has proven a
model of organizational adaptability.
E. THE UTILITY OF THE FRAMEWORK
Of possible interest for subsequent research, in the author's opinion,
is an effort toward codification of a framework for organizational analysis.
While the framework offered in this thesis has largely served the author's
purpose of systemically capturing the IDF as an organization over a 40-
year period, there clearly remains room for improvement.
The framework offered in Chapter II recognizes a failure to ade-
quately identify and gauge for relative importance the entirety of possible
inputs into any organizational environment. Instead, only those inputs
most obvious to the author in the course of his research were utilized.
Clearly, this framework could be improved, albeit complicated, with a
more complete accounting of these inputs.
The use of the Mintzberg model to depict the six parts of any func-
tional organization was useful but, once again, could stand improvement.
In the author's opinion, this model should be supplemented with another
category- hardware. It was difficult to capture the essence of an organi-
zation such as the IDF while strictly focusing on its people. While tech-
nology is an appropriate input in the organizational environment, fielded
weapons systems are as much a part of the military organization as its
ideology or its technostructure.
The framework offered in this thesis used the principles of war to
capture organizational outputs. This approach was adequate in
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summarizing combat outcomes but, once again, might be improved. In a
thesis of broader or different scope, a framework might include an
analysis of the organization's approach to fighting the various levels of
war. In this way, strategy, operations, and tactics could be discussed as
separate entities as appropriate.
This framework could also be improved in its ability to adequately
capture the existing environment. The amount of variety which pervades
the organization at a given time is most difficult to quantify and relies
heavily upon the researcher's intuition and interpretation of source
material. It is in this attempt to rate the relative complexity and dyna-
mism of a particular organizational environment at a specific time that
possible error can be introduced. While the author offers no solution to
this problem, it is crucial that the reader understands this limitation in
the framewcrk from the beginning.
While this framework can obviously be improved, it must also be
reaffirmed that as a method of systemic analysis on a limited scope, it
has proven successful. The ihistory of the IDF as seen through the lens of
this framework is remarkably clear. In the space of this short thesis, the
growth and changes in the IDF as a military organization over 40 years
have been catalogued. In the author's opinion, the ultimate utility of this
framework is in offering a disciplined approach to analysis of organiza-
tional tendencies over time.
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